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DEPOSITORY

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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A Milestone in the Alliance for Progress

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

Ambassadors, representatives, ministers, Mr. Secretary:² Today marks another milestone in the Alliance for Progress. For today we begin to select the panel of experts established by the Charter of Punta del Este.³

This panel is an historic innovation, not only in inter-American relations but in the effort to develop the economies of half the world. Not since the Marshall plan has a group of allied nations embarked on a program of regional development guided by a regional body largely selected by the developing nations themselves.

These experts will review the long-term development plans of the Latin American nations, advising them on measures to strengthen the plans and the self-help and the social reform measures which will accompany them. In addition they will provide help in financing agencies to provide external resources in the most effective manner.

I am confident that the skills and ability of the men you select will enable the nations of the hemisphere to benefit greatly from their work. And I assure you that the United States will give the greatest possible weight to the conclusions of the experts in the distribution of funds. Similarly, we will instruct our representatives to international agencies to rely heavily on the work of the panel.

I am confident that this new and imaginative creation of the inter-American system will vastly strengthen our common effort—the Alliance for Progress for all our people.

¹ Made before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 29 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

² José A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

U.S. Makes \$6 Million Available for Pan American Union Projects

The Department of State announced on November 29 (press release 825) that an agreement¹ was signed that day making U.S. Government funds in the amount of \$6 million available to the Pan American Union to assist in financing technical assistance projects to be carried out under the Alliance for Progress. President Kennedy signed the agreement for the United States and Dr. José A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, signed for the Pan American Union.

¹ For text, see press release 825 dated Nov. 29.

I have also, today, signed an agreement for the use of \$6 million in Alliance for Progress funds to strengthen the OAS. This money will be used for studies and technical assistance, called for by the Charter of Punta del Este, to help nations in planning the growth of their economies. Thus a pledge of long standing has been fulfilled.

I would also like to express my gratification at the important progress which has been made since the Alliance for Progress was proposed in March.⁴

In August the American nations drafted the Charter of Punta del Este—the framework for the decade of development—a document whose scope and significance is matched only by the charter of the OAS itself. The Inter-American Bank, ECLA [U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America], and the OAS have agreed to provide development missions to assist nations in their planning—and some of these missions are

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

already in the field. In addition, you have strengthened the machinery of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and prepared for today's selection of the panel of experts.

For its part the United States has streamlined its own AID [Agency for International Development] program, placing general responsibility for coordination of our effort in the hands of a distinguished administrator with long experience in the work of development—Ambassador [Teodoro] Moscoso. And we have already developed new sets of standards to guide our work.

In these and in many other ways we have developed the basic structure for our future effort—for the work of the next 10 years. But we have not waited for the establishment of that structure to begin our work.

All over Latin America new development plans are being formulated, and some have already been completed. New tax- and land-reform programs—basic requirements of social progress—have been instituted or are being prepared. Many of the American nations are now mobilizing their resources, and the energies of their people, for the task of development. And the United States, for its part, has already committed more than \$800 million of the more than a billion dollars which it pledged to the first year of the Alliance—a year which ends on March 13.

But despite this speed, I am determined to do better, as far as this country goes, in the coming months. The urgent needs of our people in this hemisphere cannot wait. Their need for food and shelter, for education and relief from poverty, and, above all, their need to feel hope for their future and the future of their children, demand attention and toil this year, this month, today.

Measured by the past, we have moved swiftly. Measured by the needs of the future, we must all do much better. And I can assure you that the energies of this Government, and my own personal efforts, will be devoted to speeding up the pace of development. For I share with you a determination that before this decade comes to a close the Americas will have entered upon a new era when the material progress of American man and woman, and the justice of his society, will match the spiritual and cultural achievements of this hemisphere.

I am fully aware of the immensity of the task and of the difficulties that we face. But I know

we share the faith of one of the earliest settlers of my country, William Bradford of Massachusetts, who, when told in 1630 that the hazards of settling this part of the United States were too great to overcome, answered:

All great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and must be both enterprised and overcome with answerable courage. . . . the dangers were great, but not desperate; the difficulties were many, but not invincible. . . . all of them, through the help of God, by fortitude and patience, might either be borne or overcome.

We shall overcome them.

U.S. Rebuts Cuban Charges in OAS of Intervention in Dominican Affairs

Statement by deLesseps S. Morrison¹

The statement and charges just made by the delegate from Cuba, as has been so characteristic of his frequent utterances in this Council for many months, lack any relationship to the truth. He pretends to find a threat to the peace and security of the Caribbean area in the sympathetic attitude of the Government of the United States of America, shared by other governments, toward efforts to bring about a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy in the Dominican Republic.

May I repeat to the delegate from Cuba what has been said so often in reply to his frequent propagandistic outbursts—the real danger to the peace and security of the Caribbean area and to the independence of every American state lies in the suppression of freedom and democracy in Cuba and in the subservience of his Government to the Communist bloc in a manner which permits the once independent country of Cuba to be used as an instrument of subversion and agitation throughout the hemisphere. This is what constitutes a threat to the hemisphere, as has been made so abundantly clear in this Council in recent weeks.

¹ Made at a special session of the Council of the Organization of American States at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 22 (press release 814) in answer to charges by Cuba of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Morrison is U.S. Representative on the OAS Council.

I will not at this time make any effort to take up in detail the many falsehoods, distortions, and insults which comprise the Cuban note.² Neither do I intend to go into detail regarding the numerous procedural incongruities with which this special session of the Council confronts us today. These include, however, (1) the strange circumstance of a regime—and a discredited regime at that—demanding an opportunity to present the case of a sovereign government which is fully and adequately represented; (2) the simultaneous approach of the Castro regime to both the United Nations and the OAS to take up this alleged affront to a third government, particularly after it has systematically ignored the regional organization of which it pretends to be a responsible member when it happens to suit its convenience; (3) the curious manner of presentation of the request for an extraordinary meeting of this Council on a matter which has been before this Council and under consideration by an appropriate committee since August of 1960. Obviously the delegate from Cuba has been required to ignore these procedural aspects in order to continue with the consistent pattern of Cuban efforts, which is to use and misuse any forum which may be available to it to spew forth its dangerous propaganda.

Recent Developments in Dominican Republic

The facts regarding recent developments in the Dominican Republic are well known to the members of this Council. They have been the subject matter of recent meetings of the Special Committee on the Dominican Republic to carry out the mandate given to the Council by Resolution I of the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers.³ They have been given full and adequate publicity. With particular reference to the statements made by the United States in this connection, may I call attention to the following:

1. On November 14, 1961, the Special Representative of the United States on the Special Committee presented a formal statement summarizing the reaction of my Government to the recently prepared report of the subcommittee of that Com-

mittee.⁴ Based upon our view that recognition should be given to "constructive efforts" that had been made by the Government of the Dominican Republic to remove the basis for the OAS action which was taken in August of 1960, my Government proposed withdrawal of the formal indication made by the Council on January 4, 1961, that it was "feasible and desirable" to extend suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic to petroleum and petroleum products and trucks and spare parts for trucks. An important consideration in this proposal was the fact that "key figures closely associated with the former regime" had departed, since it appeared important that leading figures closely associated with the former dictatorship should no longer be able to dominate the political and economic life of the Dominican Republic.

2. Shortly after the meeting in which the above statement was made, and while the other members of the Committee were considering further the problems before it, two of the above-mentioned "leading figures," members of the Trujillo family, returned to the Dominican Republic from their brief sojourn abroad. As a result of this development, which clearly appeared a backward step, the United States representative recommended postponement of a decision regarding the date on which the Special Committee would vote on the above problem.⁵ This was accepted by the Committee.

3. On November 18, the Secretary of State issued the following statement:⁶

It has been confirmed that leading figures who were closely associated with the repressive measures of the former dictatorship in the Dominican Republic and who had departed from that country returned to Ciudad Trujillo on November 15.

Moreover, it appears that they may be planning an attempt to reassert dictatorial domination of the political and economic life of that country, threatening the recent gains of the Dominican Government and people toward democratization.

On the recommendation of the United States, the Special Committee of the Organization of American States has already postponed further consideration of a proposal on withdrawing the suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic in certain products.

In view of the possibility of political disintegration and

² Not printed here.

³ For statements made by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on Aug. 18 and 20, 1960, together with text of Resolution I, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 929.

⁵ *Ibid.*, footnote 4, p. 932.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 931.

the dangerous situation which could ensue, the Government of the United States is considering the further measures that unpredictable events might warrant.

4. As signs of political disintegration appeared, and the possibility of an even more dangerous situation increased, units of the U.S. Navy were stationed near the Dominican Republic on the high seas and constituted a friendly presence with the full knowledge of the constitutional authorities and responsible leaders of the Dominican Republic.

5. The stationing of these units of the U.S. Fleet on the high seas outside the territorial waters and outside the airspace of any sovereign government, in no way was or is an act of intervention violating the sovereignty or territorial integrity of a sovereign state, or contrary to any international obligations. There have been no flights by United States aircraft over Dominican territory as the delegate of Cuba charges.

Record of Castro Regime

May I point to the sharp contrast which is offered by the record of the Castro regime during the past 3 years with respect to the Dominican Republic, for whose rights Cuba now appears to be so concerned:

In June 1959 an expedition which had been organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials invaded the Dominican Republic. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic. The principal leader of the invasion—Delio Gómez Ochoa—was captured and eventually allowed by the Trujillos to return to Cuba.

A Dominican closely associated with the Castro regime—López Molina—was personally protected by the Trujillos after his return to the Dominican Republic in June 1960 and encouraged to form a Castro-Communist political party at the same time that the Trujillos were persecuting the democratic opposition. Recently President Balaguer has acted against both totalitarian elements: The Trujillo clan has been forced to abandon the country while López Molina has been arrested for deportation.

In a televised interview on January 6, 1961, shortly after he returned from behind the Iron Curtain, "Che" Guevara referred to Trujillo as "now our friend." The understanding between the Castro-Communist dictatorship and the Trujillo dictatorship illustrates once again the historical affinity of totalitarian systems of the two extremes.

Radio broadcasts positively identified as coming from a station in or about the city of Habana on November 20, 1961, repeatedly incited armed revolt in the Dominican Republic against the very government that was ridding the country of the dictators, using words such as these:

All power in the hands of the people! All weapons in the hands of the people! The weapons are in the barracks. Nothing can stop it; . . . Take over the weapons necessary to destroy the repressive apparatus!

All to the battle! All to the streets! . . . All power in the hands of the people! All weapons in the hands of the people! The entire government in revolutionary hands!

I wish to emphasize that this incitement was aimed at the government that was eliminating dictatorial rule. Such broadcasts emanating from a police state have official approval.

Stripped of all its calculated insult, of all of the cynical appeal to inter-American instruments which the Castro regime has long since cast aside, the Cuban note constitutes a flagrant attempt to intervene in the courageous efforts of the Dominican people to achieve a new and democratic life for their country. What hollow mockery more ridiculous than the references made in that note to the "struggle of another American people for true democracy and national liberty"! This from a dictatorship which has made itself subservient to the foremost dictatorial system of modern times, and from a regime which speaks of "true democracy" while suppressing every form of liberty and freedom to which its own people have aspired. What solemn words about intervention from a government which has dedicated itself to the proposition that governments which do not conform to its own ugly image must be subverted and destroyed! The hysteria of its clamor will never hide the reality of the misery which it has brought upon the Cuban people.

The Dominican people in emerging from the tyranny of the Trujillo era have won an important

initial victory. It is heartwarming to see their great happiness and jubilation as manifest in the wave of celebration going on throughout the Dominican Republic and participated in by all the democratic forces of the country. They have a right to be heartened by the fact that a military coup which was being planned and in the making did not succeed, and as they look forward to strengthening the freedom they have won they also have a right to claim the sympathy and support of the governments and peoples of the hemisphere in their own efforts to guard against other extremists who are already trying to impose on the Dominican Republic a new dictatorship—a dictatorship as deadly as the Trujillos' to individual liberties and representative democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that in this instance the attack has reached a new low of irrelevance, hypocrisy, and slander which we should all contemplate very carefully.

U.S. Expresses Concern Over Events in Dominican Republic

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 30

Press release 829 dated November 30

The United States Government is deeply anxious that the people of the Dominican Republic bring to a successful conclusion their efforts to establish democratic government.

The United States joined the other nations of the Americas in condemning—through collective sanctions¹—the regime of Generalissimo Trujillo. Since his death we have supported in every appropriate way a rapid transition toward democratic government. We especially welcomed and lent sympathetic encouragement to the successful resistance to the efforts by the brothers of the late dictator to reassert totalitarian domination. We intend to continue our encouragement of all responsible peaceful efforts to secure freedom for the Dominican people. We think it is of the utmost importance that the people of the Dominican Republic continue on the path toward democracy, and we hope that all men of good will in the

Dominican Republic will exercise moderation and responsibility in seeking the political means by which a truly democratic future for the country may be assured.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DECEMBER 1²

The United States is concerned that events in the Dominican Republic yesterday may signify a backward step in the movement of the Dominican people along the path toward democratic government. These developments are particularly disappointing in view of the considerable progress made in the past few months toward democratization and in view of the recent negotiations between the Balaguer government and leaders of the moderate opposition which held out so much hope for an early and peaceful solution of the political, social, and economic problems of that country. The U.S. Government, which has consistently given sympathetic support to the democratic aspirations of the Dominican people, hopes that responsible elements in the Dominican Republic, both within and outside of the Government, will continue to strive through the exercise of statesmanship and moderation to reach a prompt resolution of the present situation.

Brazil Receives First AID Loan

Press release 802 dated November 20

The first loan made by the United States Agency for International Development was signed on November 20 by Roberto Campos, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, and Teodoro Moscoso, AID Regional Administrator for Latin America. The loan agreement makes available \$50 million of a total of \$100 million in credits earmarked for Brazil by AID.

The purpose of the loan is to provide further assistance to the Brazilian Government's program of promoting economic and social progress under conditions of financial stability. These objectives are an essential part of the Alliance for Progress concept as expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este.¹

² Read to news correspondents by a Department press officer on Dec. 1.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 358; Feb. 20, 1961, p. 273; and Dec. 4, 1961, p. 929.

Since the inception of a new economic and financial program earlier this year, Brazil has sought to achieve the twin goals of economic growth and economic stabilization. The new government which came into office in September has expressed its determination to pursue these objectives with renewed vigor. In his speech before the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies on November 14, Prime Minister [Tancredo] Neves stressed the importance of further action along these lines, including measures to bring inflation under control and to strengthen Brazil's external financial position through a free exchange system. He presented a number of proposals for legislation to carry the program forward, including a comprehensive revision of tax laws.

The loan agreement is a further step in the implementation of the financial agreements concluded between the United States and Brazil in May 1961.² At that time the United States announced \$338 million in new credits, which were accompanied by new credits from other governments, from private sources, and from international financial institutions. At the same time, arrangements were made for the rescheduling of Brazilian debts abroad. Of the \$338 million, \$100 million was conditional upon the action taken by the United States Congress on the foreign aid program for 1962. The recent passage of the Act for International Development has enabled the United States to implement this part of the arrangement.

The \$50 million released under the loan agreement will bring total drawings on U.S. Government credits, under the May arrangements, to \$178 million. All of these releases have taken place since September 7, 1961.

The proceeds of the loan will be used to help Brazil finance essential imports from the United States. In order to contribute most effectively to the objective of easing Brazil's foreign debt repayment obligations, particularly during the next few years, repayment of the loan will be made in 40 years without interest and with no payments during the first 10 years. Repayment will be in dollars. There will be a small credit fee of three-quarters of 1 percent of the balance outstanding each year.

²*Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 862.

Great Seal Dedicated at Torch of Friendship in Miami

*Remarks by Angier Biddle Duke
Chief of Protocol¹*

We are assembled here this afternoon at the Torch of Friendship to install the Great Seal of the United States at this monument. The first national seal of another great American Republic, Peru, has already been placed here. In placing our own here today we are reaffirming not only our historic ties to our brothers in the New World but our commitment to a common future with them in an Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere.

It is most appropriate that this Torch of Friendship stand in this spot at the gateway of the Americas. Miami's role as the link between the Americas is most fittingly memorialized in this monument to friendship—a friendship which has been put to a hard and cruel test since January 1, 1960.

For the first time in the history of our country the United States has become a land of first asylum for those seeking freedom from abroad. Traditionally we have opened our hearts and our gates to refugees from tyranny and oppression from overseas after they have found their way to us through other countries. Now we find neighbors literally throwing themselves on our mercy at the first instance of disaster. Their tragedy has quite literally meant a sobering burden to their hosts in Miami and in the State of Florida. This freedom torch is symbolic of the hand of friendship which you have extended in dark times of need, and, as such, I believe it will come to partake in our Southern Hemisphere of much the same aura of majesty and significance as enshrines the Statue of Liberty.

To Mayor [Robert K.] High and the Councilors of the City of Miami goes so much of the credit for the vision and imagination of this inspiring project. But, as it is a symbol of friendship in times of trial and trouble, it is also a symbol of hopes for a future in freedom for our beleaguered neighbors in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Under the leadership of President Kennedy, the

¹ Made at ceremonies dedicating the Great Seal of the United States at the Torch of Friendship at Miami, Fla., on Nov. 22 (press release 804 dated Nov. 21).

Alliance for Progress, called into being last January and ratified in August at Punta del Este,² is now moving from the planning to the action stage. I sometimes wonder if many of us understand the very profound implications of this massive program. It seems to me that some of us are prone to consider large-scale assistance to Latin America within the same frame of reference as the Marshall plan; yet it must be recalled that the \$10 billion fed into the economic structure of Europe was able to be absorbed and turned to constructive use by a highly developed industrial society with the manpower trained and skilled to manage and administer it successfully. Europe, no matter how badly battered and bruised, was a going concern with a long tradition and experience in industrialization, commerce, and transportation.

In Latin America, however, we know that many of these essential factors are virtually missing. Latin American countries, for example, trade more with Europe and with the United States than they do with each other. The economic basis of society is still largely agricultural, and mostly monocultural at that, with a system of land ownership which assures uneven distribution of the fruits of production and inhibits the diversification of capital.

It is easy to describe the inadequacies of societies. It is easy to understand that a massive application of capital to their structure will not in itself shore them up or solve their problems. Their economic and social institutions through their own efforts must be modernized and equipped to be able to receive this kind of help. Our problem, of course, is how to work out with our neighbors ways and means of directing capital flow so as to increase their own productive capacity. And this must be done with speed and urgency, pressed as we are by the ongoing revolution of rising expectations. Lipservice has been paid throughout the Americas to recognition of the need for emergency evolution, reform, and modernized institutions. Yet what this will actually mean in practice is a marked change in the social and economic system prevailing in most countries in the Southern Hemisphere.

I am not concerned at the moment with the ability or the sincerity of the people who must manage this movement in Latin America. I am

led to believe that there is a burgeoning group of dedicated and educated men who are eager to meet our assistance with reformed and revitalized institutions, capable of absorbing that assistance. But what I am concerned about is our own sincerity. Do all of us really mean what we say? Are the stirring words of hope for reform, for a democratic and free society, for a release of the energies of the submerged majority merely the comfortable clichés of Pan American Day speakers? Do we in effect know what we are talking about or understand the implications when we call for a release of these energies?

Our American press is often and, in my view, rightly criticized for its failure to publish interpretive analyses of Latin American affairs—articles which will educate the American public on the basic forces at work in Latin America. In defense of our press, perhaps public interest in the Americas does not extend much beyond the spot news. This interest will grow as the Alliance for Progress is implemented by the terms of the Punta del Este Charter. The translation of this developing program into action will indeed be news.

In some ways I do not envy the role of an American ambassador today in Latin America at a time when the restless, growing, and ambitious middle class, backed by new productive power being infused by our own Alliance for Progress program, is beginning to break up or transform the institutions of the past. The pressures on our ambassador from the right and from the left will challenge every ounce of ingenuity, integrity, and ability that he will be able to summon. On the other hand, he is challenged by serving his country in an era to which generations to come may point as the turning point in the battle for survival and freedom in our New World.

This ambassador, in fact all of our representatives abroad, will be carrying out the policy of the American people. I hope we understand that policy, that we understand the stakes involved and the profound implications to us in either its failure or its success. This program is going to be many times more difficult to implement than the Marshall plan and at least as important.

Here in Florida, as close as you are to the Southern Hemisphere, I feel that there is an understanding of the grave and serious nature of the course on which we have embarked. It is our common

² BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

hope that your interest, understanding, and support will be matched throughout the country.

The people of Miami who have established this Torch of Friendship deserve the highest recogni-

tion for the responsible role being played during this epic period. And it is therefore with great pride that I hereby affix to this Torch of Friendship the Great Seal of the United States.

Redefining the Potentials of the Democratic Faith

by Under Secretary Bowles¹

For the last 2 weeks I have been traveling through east and southeast Asia, visiting Tokyo, Singapore, Djakarta, and attending the annual meeting of the Colombo Plan nations in Kuala Lumpur in the beautiful and dynamic new nation of Malaya.² This trip served to refresh my knowledge of what I believe may become the most decisive geopolitical area in the world. It also helped to put our own country in sharper focus, and this provides the basis for my remarks here tonight.

Unless I am seriously mistaken, we are approaching a watershed in regard to the world, our economy, and relations with other nations. We are at the end of the postwar period, poised uncertainly before the opening of a new era in the history of man. I believe that the political, economic, and social confusions which are evident within our own society are part of the ferment that precedes great national decisions.

In such a period it is not surprising that some of our fellow citizens should seek to find their way back to old patterns of life that appear more understandable and controllable. Yet the strength of the current conservative movement may be exaggerated by the fact that it has developed in a time of political transition. The positive ideas which sooner or later will invigorate our public debates are not yet clearly defined, nor have they yet taken root.

In the meantime at least three powerful political

forces are at work in our society, no one of which is likely to succumb to old slogans or to fit easily into familiar political pigeonholes. Bit by bit each of us is being pressed to come to grips with these forces, to rethink our attitudes toward public questions, to abandon sterile concepts, and to stake out new positions.

Meeting the Global Pressures

The first of these three forces is the massive impact of the interrelated postwar world on our American society and our search for a more realistic response.

For the last 15 years many of us have been assuring each other that the global pressures which we have been striving to meet are temporary, that, if we were wise and courageous, the so-called world emergency would somehow subside, and that this would leave us happily undisturbed with nothing to do but enjoy our material comforts. This dangerously parochial view is due partly to the pull of our isolationist past and partly to the distorted view of world affairs that developed as a result of the specially favored position from which we tackled international problems following the war.

In the late 1940's Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had been largely devastated by war. Japan was striving to get back on its feet. In Communist China an uncertain new government was faced with the staggering problems created by 20 years of exhausting civil war.

The American economy alone was physically intact, strengthened by heavy wartime investment, and raring to go. American military power was firmly based in a monopoly of nuclear weapons.

¹Address made before the Yale Law Forum at New Haven, Conn., on Nov. 21 (press release 805).

²For text of a statement made by Mr. Bowles at the Colombo Plan meeting, see BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1961, p. 988.

As a result, American power relative to that of other nations was overwhelming. As we looked around the world, there was almost nothing we could not do if we had the will to do it.

In the last few years this situation has been profoundly altered. As we enter the decade of the sixties a vital new Europe is creating the first integrated society since the Romans, the Soviet Union has emerged with industrial and military power second only to our own, and China under a tough and embittered Communist government has been developing some alarmingly expansionist notions in regard to its neighbors. Simultaneously Asia, Africa, and Latin America have awakened to the exciting fact that illiteracy, poverty, and ill health may gradually be eliminated and that new opportunities can be created for their people.

The result is a world of infinite potential and of profound uncertainties. Is it then surprising that the more timid of us should be anxious to withdraw from it, or to ignore it, or to wish it out of existence?

In the coming months we shall be called upon to make some critically important decisions on how to deal with this new world. What path will we follow?

If we choose the negative path of high tariffs, of disdain for the United Nations, of impatient attempts to impose our will on others as a requirement for American assistance, we shall run the grave danger of national destruction; at the very best we will see our great country with its long tradition of democratic government becoming increasingly isolated from the dynamic new world which has been taking shape.

If, on the other hand, we choose the affirmative path of world cooperation and participation, we will be called upon for a degree of mutual patience, sacrifice, and fresh thinking that will challenge our very best efforts.

The questions that will appear on our agenda are formidable indeed:

How can we build an economic and political partnership with non-Communist nations?

How can we develop freer and greatly expanded world trade and still maintain full employment?

How can we best help the new nations of the world not only to ease their economic difficulties but to do so in a way that increases their sense of dignity?

How can we deal most fruitfully with the new

Europe which is building itself up across the Atlantic?

Is a new power balance of some kind possible in Asia?

Can the powerful new China be persuaded to adopt a more moderate course, or will a head-on conflict become inevitable?

Can the United Nations develop into an effective instrument of world peace in its own right?

Can there be a realistic program of arms control?

How should we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union?

The implications of such questions are infinite. Is it any wonder that many Americans would prefer to retreat into their intellectual bomb shelters in the hope that when they come out the world will have somehow returned to the more orderly pattern of their father's day?

This brings us to yet another crucial question: In a world setting of this kind how do we define a "liberal" and what is a "conservative"? For instance, is the labor leader who demands high tariffs as the answer for every domestic economic problem still a liberal because he once supported Roosevelt's New Deal? And how about the anti-New Deal businessman who now vigorously supports expanded foreign aid and freer trade? Is he still a conservative?

Strengthening the Domestic Economy

Let us turn to the second force which I believe will help shape the political patterns of the 1960's, namely the evolving pressures within our own economy. As we attempt to cope with these pressures we again find that many old concepts begin to sound hollow if not irrelevant.

Working at its most effective and dynamic best our capitalistic system has been based on able management, small unit profits, and a vigorous sales effort to achieve the largest possible volume, with profits increasing as volume expands.

In certain industries we now see this formula hopelessly compromised by price and wage manipulation which has little relevance to economic realities. In some industries we see prices arbitrarily set to provide for substantial profits with 25 percent or more of productive capacity lying idle. In others we face featherbedding practices in the labor movement which slow down production and raise costs and prices correspondingly.

Taking a broad view, it is clear that we have been drifting into a situation in which powerful vested interests find it possible to protect their own economic interests with several million people unemployed and an important fraction of our people ill-nourished, ill-housed, and poorly educated.

What is required is a searching reexamination to determine why many areas of our economy remain stagnant, why our rate of growth has lagged behind that of most industrial countries, why 20 percent of all American families are still living on less than \$2,000 a year, and why unemployment stubbornly persists in many centers of population at a time that calls for all the production that we can get.

Among the various questions about our domestic economy which are waiting to be asked and answered are the following:

How can we reorganize our housing industry to build more and better homes each year at lower prices?

How can we speed up the rebuilding of our cities so that our slums may be wiped out in the decade of the sixties?

How can we make the best medical attention available to those who are in greatest need?

Above all, how can we strengthen our public educational system to insure that all bright American boys and girls can enter college?

Such questions would be important at any period in our history. Yet today, when our society is facing the challenge of Communist concepts of development and growth, they are of the utmost urgency.

Our search for better answers should not be confined to local, State, and Federal governments. It should enlist the best minds in our labor unions, our universities, our business and farm organizations.

Our economy is the essential instrument with which we must achieve greater opportunity and security for all citizens, assure an adequate defense system, and provide the resources with which to ease the growing pains of new nations that are striving to relieve their poverty through democratic institutions.

Only a confident, dynamic America can meet this challenge. Yet built-in obstacles to expanding production have kept us on dead center.

Eliminating Discrimination

The third force with which we must contend in this period of political reorientation is found in the rapidly growing demands of our Negro citizens for full citizenship in what we believe to be the greatest democracy on earth. For generations the struggle against racial discrimination was largely spearheaded by white Americans whose consciences told them that discrimination against any group was a violation of their moral creed. Now the lead is being taken by Negro Americans who are calling upon Negro fellow citizens to demand their rights under our Constitution. The response grows month by month.

Moreover, these voices are now heard not only in our own country but increasingly throughout the world. As long as we deny full democratic rights to those Americans whose ancestors came from Africa we cannot expect the representatives of the Asian and African nations to accept our protestation of democratic faith.

Of the 100 ambassadors in Washington, D.C., a large percentage are from Africa and Asia. They are the proud representatives of new nations, determined to make their voices heard and their views respected.

Again the obvious questions present themselves:

How can the moderates of the South be persuaded to speak out more vigorously?

How can the real-estate discrimination which now creates Negro tenement areas in most northern cities be counteracted?

How can we create a national climate that will make faster school integration possible?

How can we persuade the two-thirds of the world which is colored that the land that revered Thomas Jefferson still believes in what Jefferson said?

These then are the three challenges which face the American people in the decade of the sixties: our relations with the world, our ability to improve the performance of our economy, and our efforts to eliminate discrimination against any American on the grounds of race, creed, or religion.

Out of our conflicting reactions to these questions new political patterns will almost certainly emerge in the 1960's. Since the old political tags of "liberal," "conservative," "radical," or "reactionary" are rapidly losing their

relevance, the sooner a new orientation develops, the better it will be for all of us. The slogans which moved us in the 1930's are leaving an increasing number of Americans uninspired and apathetic.

This Christmas vacation thousands of college-age sons will listen politely as their fathers nostalgically refight the battles of the New Deal years. Fathers will explain how as young liberals they boldly stormed the ramparts of the National Association of Manufacturers, or how as young conservatives they fought the battle for a financial "soundness" which left no room for TVA, social security, or public housing.

Although the sons are expected to listen respectfully, they may be pardoned if they feel that this history of old wars lost and won is becoming increasingly irrelevant to their own era. The most thoughtful among them will know that the struggle is now being switched to new battlegrounds, that the bugle is calling for new alignments.

I do not suggest that the lines of political argument and action that will divide us in the 1960's will be totally unconnected with the past. Liberalism in any age calls for belief in certain universal values which must be reframed by each generation in response to the realities of its own experience and objectives.

In the new days as in the old, conservative thinkers may be expected to draw more vigorously from the past and to approach the future with greater misgivings. The more extreme among them will demand that we withdraw from the United Nations and from our alliances, that we slash our governmental budgets, slow down our efforts to rebuild our cities and improve our education, and that we urge American Negroes to be patient for yet a little while. In effect they will be saying, "Stop the world, we want to get off."

But the world will not stop, and not even the most timid of us can get off.

No period in history provides such awesome dangers as does our fast-changing world of today; nor does any period offer such exhilarating opportunities for the individual to grow, for his dignity to become a reality, and for human energies to be released for the common good.

Thus we may hope to hear the liberal-minded people of tomorrow call for a stronger world partnership between ourselves and other non-Com-

munist nations, increased concern for freedom and well-being of other people, added determination not merely to stand up to Soviet threats but to create a better society here at home in which men are free to do what they are capable of doing, no matter what their race, their creed, or their color.

The Soviet Union and Communist China represent growing industrial and military power, and communism will continue to have dangerous appeal for the weak and the frustrated. Yet if we Americans provide bold and affirmative alternatives I believe that hundreds of millions of human beings will come to see communism as the sterile and outmoded doctrine that it is, offering nothing to the spirit, nothing to those who seek a faith to live by, in short, nothing to anyone but the hollow promise of ruthless and bankrupt materialism.

As the true meaning of democracy is debated in the new framework, as new differences are crystallized and new political postures chosen, we must hope that the advantage will continue to lie with those who place above all else the rights and responsibilities of man.

It is the task of such people to redefine the potentials of democratic faith in the framework of today's dangerous, exciting, and promising world. Let us pray that they may have the courage and insight to do so.

The most crucially important questions involving the future of our nation and of our universal faith are waiting to be asked and answered. The way in which we Americans answer these questions in the early 1960's will be decisive, I believe, for many generations to come.

East German Communist Intelligence Official Defects to West

Press release 818 dated November 28

How East Berlin is used for subversive activities against the Federal Republic of Germany and a great number of other countries was disclosed on November 28 by the announcement at Bonn, West Germany, of the defection of a senior officer of the secret service of the so-called "German Democratic Republic."¹ According to the announcement,

¹ A limited number of copies of a Department of State report on "Soviet Bloc Espionage Centers in East Berlin" is available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

made by the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany, the defector, Guenter Maennel, was a member of the Hauptverwaltung fuer Aufklaerung (HVA), which is charged with intelligence operations abroad.

Maennel's unit, according to his own admission, was engaged in activities against North and South America as well as several countries in Scandinavia, Africa, and in the Middle East. Maennel has identified a total of 14 agents who are or were stationed in these areas and has revealed that a unit of the HVA is headed by Brigadier Markus Wolf, a Soviet citizen of German birth, and has more than 500 staff officers engaged in espionage and subversion.

Maennel has described the activities of his unit from East Berlin. The Soviet sector of Berlin, he makes clear, also serves the intelligence services of other Soviet bloc countries as a springboard for their espionage activities against the Federal Republic and other countries. In addition, these services use the Soviet sector as a base for kidnapping or assassination of their political enemies and for their efforts against non-Communist countries.

The Soviet Government and its propagandists in the Soviet sector of Berlin have claimed that free Berlin is a center of espionage and subversion. Maennel's disclosures emphasize that the recent Soviet propaganda attacks on West Berlin are sheer hypocrisy. He declared that the Soviet secret police are increasingly using the foreign trade and press representatives of the East German regime to conduct subversion and political espionage in a great number of countries.

Four American Missionaries Released at Lisbon

Department Statement

Press release S35 dated December 2

The Department of State is pleased to report that four American missionaries of the Methodist

Church, who have been under arrest by Portuguese authorities since early September, were released today in Lisbon, Portugal. The four men are Wendell L. Golden, Rockford, Ill.; Marion Way, Jr., Charleston, S.C.; Fred Brancel, Endeavor, Wis.; and Edwin LeMaster, Lexington, Ky. The men will be deported from Portuguese territory. The intention of the Portuguese authorities to deport the missionaries once the investigation of their cases was completed had been previously indicated to the American Embassy at Lisbon on October 17.

The men were arrested on September 5 and 6 in Angola, where they had been working under the auspices of the American Methodist Missionary Board. The American consul at Luanda, Angola, discussed their detention with police authorities on the day of their arrest, and several times subsequently, and visited the men on September 7, 8, and 9. The American Embassy at Lisbon first discussed their arrest with the Portuguese Foreign Ministry on September 7.

The four missionaries were transferred to Lisbon on September 17. They were met on arrival there by a representative of the Embassy. Officers of the Embassy visited the men frequently during their imprisonment, ascertained that their needs and wants were being met, and provided them with certain materials such as books, magazines, and toilet articles to ease their detention. C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, visited the missionaries personally. Following his visit he wrote letters to their wives assuring them that the men were being well treated and were in good health.

From the day of their arrest, the imprisonment of the missionaries received close and continuing attention from the Department of State and our Foreign Service posts in Lisbon and Luanda. On instructions from the Department of State, officers of the American Embassy at Lisbon, including the Ambassador, discussed the detention of the four men with judicial authorities and officials of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry on a series of occasions.

The Aspirations of Asia

by U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹

I appreciate that it is perhaps somewhat presumptuous for an American to choose the subject of "The Aspirations of Asia," for it is only an Asian who could speak with full confidence and authority on such a subject. However, I hope my Asian friends will pardon me if, on the basis of somewhat extended service in a number of countries of the area, I presume to give my impressions of what the many peoples of that great area are seeking and the part that the United States is playing and can play in meeting those aspirations.

While this is an economic meeting devoted primarily to economic subjects, we can no more divorce the economic aspirations of Asia from the political and spiritual aspirations than we could with any other area or people. That man does not live by bread alone is as true of Asia as of the rest of the world. It is the fundamental truth that the Communists have yet to learn and is probably the most striking weakness of the doctrine they espouse.

Above all else the peoples of Asia seek for themselves as individuals and for their countries human dignity and self-respect—in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. I know I need not say to you Americans here, who are so intimately concerned with business relations with the Far East, that these words are not empty rhetoric or some broad political principle to be applied by the Department of State but rather are most pertinent to every phase of our business and economic relations with Asia, down to our most obscure employee.

¹ Address made before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 16 (press release 786 dated Nov. 15; as-delivered text).

On the economic side it is of course a truism to say that the peoples of Asia are seeking economic betterment. This of course goes hand in hand with dignity and self-respect, for a ragged, starving man has little respect for himself or in the eyes of others. During the decade of the 1950's a great myth was foisted upon the peoples of Asia. This myth was that, while the Marxian system as practiced by the Soviet Union and Communist China might carry with it a certain loss of political freedoms, it was the answer to the cry for rapid economic development of underdeveloped countries. Communist China was to be the great model. (This was related to the older myth that there was no economic development in Russia until after the revolution of 1917.) Perhaps what may turn out to be the most profound development of these first years of the 1960's has been the puncturing of this myth with respect to China. The full dimensions of the Communist failure in China are only now beginning to emerge, and their repercussions, not only on Asia but the world as well, may be very deep indeed. What those repercussions may be it is not yet given to us to see, but it is my own conviction that they may well be among the most significant developments of this decade.

Communist Asia vs. Free Asia

None of us can take satisfaction in human suffering, whether in mainland China or any other part of the world. However, it is not we but the present rulers in Peiping who have imposed this suffering on the great Chinese people. This has come from the blind enthusiasm for rigidly approaching all problems from the

standpoint of supposed Marxian doctrine rather than from the standpoint of human welfare.

All of you will recall the announcement just a few years ago of the "great leap forward" and the dire prophecies that were made that Communist China would so far outstrip the other countries of Asia that all would see that the Chinese brand of communism was inevitably the "wave of the future" in Asia. This image of Communist China is now very tarnished indeed and becoming blacker as each month passes. It is now clear that, in spite of the substantial abandonment of the disastrous commune system, food production in Communist China today is substantially below the 1958 level, and there are now 35 to 40 million more Chinese to feed than there were in 1958. Per capita food output is now below even the level when the country was just emerging from the ravages of the civil war. Whereas in 1958, the year in which the "great leap forward" was proclaimed, staple food production was probably around 210 million tons, in 1960 the total was about 185 million tons. 1961 may be only a few million tons above that.

Average food rations are now less than the 1 catty (1.1 lbs.) which is the very minimal daily subsistence need. The average caloric intake is not over 1,600 calories, and probably 95 percent of this is starch. This deficiency has only in small part been made up by purchase of some 6 million tons of grain. Where has this grain been purchased? Not from the Communist bloc, for even after all these years of flaunted agricultural development the Soviet Union is normally still only barely able to feed itself. Rather, the grain has been purchased from the despised "capitalist" economies at the cost of probably around \$350 million.

This has been not only an agricultural failure but an industrial failure as well, for it is in the last analysis from the surplus of agricultural production that must come the capital for the industrialization of Communist China, and underfed workers are not productive workers. One statistic alone dramatically illustrates this failure. In the first half of 1961 the ration of cloth was only 1½ feet, as compared with the previous ration of about 18 feet a year. It is not without significance that since early 1960 Communist China has stopped issuing even the very limited economic data it previously made available. How-

ever, it is clear that there has also been a net drop of serious proportions in industrial production during both 1960 and 1961.

I will not bore you with statistics on the other Communist countries of Asia except to say that food production in both north Viet-Nam and north Korea has, on a gross basis, largely been standing still and, on a per capita basis, has also clearly been dropping.

What Has Been Happening in Free Asia

Let us take just a quick look at what has been happening in free Asia during these same years. In those crowded islands of Japan, with so little room for agricultural expansion, agricultural production both in absolute and per capita terms has been going steadily upward. For example, rice production went from 13½ million tons in 1956 to over 16 million tons in 1960. We of course know that the manufacturing index has gone up even faster, more than doubling in just the 5 years between 1956 and 1960. It is substantially the same story on Taiwan, with a steady increase in both food and industrial production and a steady rise in the gross national product. Between 1954 and the first half of this year the rate of industrial production in Taiwan has more than doubled. In India industrial production has about doubled in the last 10 years and agricultural production is going up in both absolute and per capita terms.

While the story may not be as dramatic in some of the other countries of free Asia, the overall picture is nevertheless one of steady gains in the well-being of the free Asian peoples. In any event the past few years have dramatically illustrated the point that the sacrifice of independence and political freedoms is not necessary for economic development and in fact may work in exactly the opposite direction. This is a lesson that is not being lost on Asia. At the same time it is probably, at least in part, the source of some of the present difficulties in the area. For example, there are some grounds for believing that the turning of north Viet-Nam in 1960 to openly declared guerrilla warfare against south Viet-Nam was the result of north Viet-Nam's recognizing that it was falling so far behind south Viet-Nam in development that it could not hope to win except by the use of murder and terror.

However, in saying this I do not want to mini-

mize the problems of free Asia; they are colossal indeed. In this territory from Korea and Japan around through Pakistan we find some 870 million people living in a territory slightly smaller than the area of our 50 States. The total national product is only about one-fifth of that of the United States and, on a per capita basis, only a very minor fraction of ours. However, this is not a hopeless situation, for, as all of you know, the peoples of Asia have in full measure those human qualities from which growth can come. Asia fell behind the industrial, political, and social revolutions that swept the Western World in the 18th and 19th centuries. Free Asia has either gone or is now going through its political and social revolutions and is beginning to move into the industrial revolution. In the case of Japan it is, of course, more than well into this latter revolution. I do not believe there is any doubt that the other countries of Asia will continue to move in the same direction, each in its own way and each with its own timing.

I know that this is something that those of you in this room do not fear but rather welcome. It is going to require adjustments on our part as well as adjustments on the part of the Asian countries concerned. In the case of individual industries and lines of endeavor this will require adjustments, some of which may be painful. It will also require adjustments for us as a government. But that the overall results will be beneficial for all our peoples there can be no doubt. As a government we are committed to assisting in this process, and your taxes are in part being used for this purpose, both directly and indirectly.

The failure of the Asian Communist regimes to keep pace economically with the free nations of the area does not of course eliminate—and, in fact, may operate, as in south Viet-Nam, so as to increase—the threat which those regimes pose to their neighbors. As you know, the United States is in many ways acting to help preserve the security of the free Asian peoples. Indirectly what you are contributing to the direct defense of these United States is also contributing to the security of the free countries of Asia.

I do not apologize to my Asian friends for mentioning this reality, which is, I fear, often overlooked. This was brought home to me the other day in my office when I was talking with a group

of students from an Asian country. During the course of our conversation they expressed confident assurance that their country need not fear an attack from Communist China because, as they put it in response to my question, Communist China knew that that would mean world war. With some surprise they agreed when I pointed out to them that their assurance really derived from their confidence that the United States would go to war on their behalf and that the nuclear weapons which they could afford to disdain, unceasingly manned by thousands of Americans, were in fact as surely protecting them as they were the United States.

Your tax dollars are also being used directly to assist these countries in contributing to their own protection, as well as in building the base upon which their own economic development can take place. What we as a government can do in this regard is, of course, very limited. For the most part we can help in a small way in building primarily the base of power, transportation, communications, and education upon which all economic development must take place. However, inevitably the greater part of the job must be done by the countries themselves. In this the capital, skill, and know-how of American private enterprise has a tremendous stake in demonstrating that flexibility, adaptability, and vision which it has demonstrated elsewhere. However, it is not my purpose to lecture you on what you can and should do in this regard in the interest of yourselves and this country. Those in this audience know this perhaps better than I.

U.S. Plans To Meet Asia's Problems

However, I can tell you what we in Washington are planning and thinking beyond our immediate economic and military cooperation programs.

First, we all know that one of the most serious problems confronting the raw-material and food-producing countries of Asia is the abrupt shifts and gyrations in the prices of the one or two commodities which are of controlling importance in their economies. Such shifts may be of little importance in a country with a highly diversified and sophisticated economy, but they can mean disaster for a country dependent upon such commodities for most of its export earnings. International commodity agreements or understandings, of course, present very complex and difficult prob-

lems, and historically they have not always accomplished their objectives. However, as the President has stated, we are prepared to cooperate in a serious case-by-case examination of commodity problems to see where we can be helpful.² In this endeavor, however, care will be required to avoid putting a straitjacket on economic structures. Change and growth are as essential to economic as to other forms of life and are to be resisted only at grave peril. However, to the extent such problems can be met, it will assist these countries in better providing and planning for the use of their own resources in their development.

There is another most important subject to which time does not now permit me to give the full consideration that it deserves. Each of you, as well as the countries of Asia, are well aware of the literal revolution in trading patterns upon which the entire world is now entering as a result of the formation and pending expansion of the European Common Market. Under Secretary Ball spoke on this subject in this city on the first of this month, and to those of you who did not hear or have not read his address, I commend it to you.³

Mr. Ball spoke of the future of relations between the United States and the Common Market and the adjustments that will be required to realize the full potential for the common good of this truly revolutionary development. I want to say to this audience today that your interests and the interests of the countries of Asia are much in the forefront of our minds in this development. We are very conscious that the interests of the United States are no less in the Pacific and Asia than they are in the Atlantic and Europe. We front on both oceans, and five of our States are literally on or in the Pacific. While we look forward to closer relations with Europe, we equally look forward to closer relations with Asia, including the field of commerce and industry. Thus, in looking toward the working out of new commercial and trade relationships with the great industrial complex represented by the Common Market, we on our part are not thinking in terms of exclusive arrangements which would discriminate against any other part of the world. Rather, in accord-

ance with our long tradition, we are thinking of arrangements under which the benefits would also accrue to other free countries, including those of Asia. Thus we seek for Asia its full share in the increasing prosperity for all peoples that is coming from this great development.

And we seek for Asia, not only because it is right but because it will benefit all mankind, including this country, a realization of the aspirations of Asia for that economic growth in individual and national dignity and self-respect which I am confident they seek for themselves. That this can and will be achieved in freedom, I have no doubt.

OECD Sets Collective Target for 50 Percent Growth in GNP

Following are texts of a statement made by Under Secretary Ball before the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris on November 16 and a communique issued by the Council on November 17.

STATEMENT BY MR. BALL

Mr. Chairman, the proposal before us this afternoon for the adoption of a target for accelerated economic growth is in our judgment both within the traditions of the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] and within the stated purposes of the OECD. It is in a sense a part of the heritage from the OEEC, of which you spoke so eloquently this morning. A growth target was adopted by members of the OEEC early in the 1950's, and it was virtually achieved by the concerting of policies among the member nations.

The first aim of the OECD, as we all know, is stated in the convention as being "to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy."¹ Mr. Chairman, what we are proposing is to give concrete and explicit form to this aim. The growth target which we have pro-

² For an address by President Kennedy on Mar. 13 setting forth his proposal for an Alliance for Progress with Latin America, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 831.

¹ For text of convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 11.

posed would call for a 50 percent increase in the real gross national products of the member nations combined between this year and the end of this decade. We have proposed that this be achieved with the maintenance of price stability and without exacerbating balance-of-payments difficulties.

Further economic growth of 50 percent would add to the Atlantic Community the economic equivalent of a new country of the present size and wealth of the United States. This is a rather striking statement of the possibilities that lie before us if we exercise determination and take the necessary policy measures. We have within our power the achievement of an unparalleled conquest—a conquest without sacrifice on the part of the people and without damage to our spiritual or cultural values, a conquest achieved merely by the effective utilization of our inherent capabilities.

The proposal to set a target for further economic growth has several implications: It makes clear to the world that accelerated growth is an obligation which we all feel, that we recognize the new state of interdependence which exists principally among the highly industrialized nations of the world represented here, and that an achievement such as this is not possible solely through uncoordinated, unrelated national efforts. It reflects our determination to use the OECD for the purposes of achieving the necessary cooperation; and it represents a determination on the part of the governments of the member nations to take the steps that are required to achieve this aim.

Accelerated economic growth is imperative. Today we live in a world experiencing unparalleled technological, political, and social change; and it is a world threatened by new forces. It is a world in which we must go forward quickly if we are to mobilize the strength necessary for the kind of society that we are all interested in and for the preservation of that society. So we feel that not only is there a potentiality of reaching this goal but that we, the individual nations represented here, actually have a responsibility to do so.

This is the means whereby we can achieve the strength that is requisite to the maintenance of peace and security. This will provide us with the means whereby we can fulfill what is an obvious and great obligation of all of us, to assist the less developed countries of the world to achieve adequate standards of living and to achieve, them-

selves, the possibility of self-sustaining growth. We have an obligation, it seems to me, to demonstrate to the whole world the strength and vitality of the Western civilization to which we subscribe and of the free institutions to which we are committed.

Finally, it seems to me that there is a very great value in the form of cooperation which is implied in the adoption of a target for accelerated economic growth. We, on the American side, consider it essential that the OECD at its first ministerial meeting should take a decision for action which is not only symbolically important but which is actually important. By setting a target for further economic growth we will demonstrate our determination to work together for freer and expanded international trade, to coordinate our monetary and fiscal policies, to adjust our internal economic policies to the needs of the whole community of OECD nations. Finally, by adopting a growth target, we give ourselves a sense of discipline, we create for ourselves a sense of direction, and we provide a frame of reference in which we can carry on our economic labors within the OECD.

In suggesting a growth target I want to make it very clear indeed that we do not minimize the need for the maintenance of price stability or the need to attain and maintain balance-of-payments equilibrium. The maintenance of equilibrium in the international balance of payments is a very complex matter. The balance of payments is subject to conflicting forces, forces which are difficult to predict in advance. The nations assembled here must be prepared to deal constructively either with deficits or with surpluses as they may appear.

Lag in U.S. Growth Rate

I believe it is quite safe to assert that the proposed agreement on a common target for economic growth will present as formidable difficulties to the United States, and involve as substantial commitments from the United States, as for any other member nation. The gross national product of the United States represents approximately 60 percent of the total gross national product of all the OECD countries combined. During recent years our rate of growth has lagged significantly behind the rate of growth in the great majority of the OECD countries.

We are suffering from certain rather unusual economic difficulties. We have an abnormally high rate of unemployment. We have had a continuing deficit in our balance of payments. We have a large unused plant capacity, and we have, as you all know, assumed international economic commitments, both with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security and with respect to the encouragement of economic growth of the less developed nations of the world, which are very great indeed. However, our economy in the United States is already beginning to solve these problems. We are recovering from the recession. Industrial production is climbing. Housing construction employment has increased.

My Government is determined that the United States will move forward to attain accelerated economic growth, which will enable us to make our full contribution to meeting the proposed goals which we put before this meeting. We are determined that we ourselves shall adopt policies that will permit us to attain this proposed rate of growth without any retreat from our international commitments. In fact, an accelerated rate of economic growth is almost essential if we are to maintain with other OECD governments these vast commitments.

The projection of a 50 percent rise in the United States output between 1961 and 1970—a compound rate of growth, as was noted by the Secretary General, of 4.6 percent a year—implies only a moderate improvement on past trends in the growth of capacity. In the middle and late 1950's the rate of growth in our capacity to produce was of the order of $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent annually. This rate of growth of potential is compounded out of a productivity growth rate of 2 percent per annum (in gross national product per person employed) and a labor force growth rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ percent. In the earlier postwar period productivity advanced more rapidly and the rate of growth was higher. Only part of this higher rate of growth was the consequence of nonrepeatable factors stemming from the depression and the war.

Actual gross national product grew at a rate of only 2.3 percent per annum between 1955 and 1960. The discrepancy between actual and potential growth output is easily explained. Some slack began to appear toward the end of the 1955-57 boom, and, more significantly, the recovery

after the recession of 1958 failed to carry the economy to its then existing potential. The rates of unemployment at the peaks of the cycle in 1957 and 1960 were 4.2 percent and 5.1 percent respectively.

It is expected that policies for the improved training and increased mobility of the labor force will, before the end of the decade, allow the economy to operate with a higher pressure of demand on capacity than seems feasible at present without inflationary pressure. Both of the peaks in the period 1955 to 1960 also found the economy with considerable excess capacity in terms both of plant and equipment.

However, the year 1961 finds our economy operating at about 93 percent of its potential output, with a gross national product of \$520 billion. If by 1963 it can attain its potential output (defined as output produced at about 4 percent unemployment) it will then have a gross national product of \$600 billion, stated in prices of the second quarter of 1961. An average rate of compound growth of 3.8 percent for the 7 years following would be sufficient to carry real GNP to \$780 billion in 1970—a 50 percent gain over 1961.

Prospects of Reaching Potential

What are the prospects that the United States economy will reach its potential in the present recovery? The prospects, we believe, are excellent given the application of sensible fiscal and monetary policies. The gross failure to achieve potential at the peak is a fairly recent phenomenon in America; and, in the present state of economic knowledge, it is a phenomenon that we are persuaded is avoidable. My Government is determined to revert to the earlier days when our performance in this respect was better.

An average growth rate of 3.8 percent after the achievement of potential is a very modest extrapolation of past trends. The $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent yearly rate of growth of potential in the latter half of the fifties was diminished by the persistent gap between actual and potential output experienced in the period. Billions of dollars' worth of investment in new plant and equipment were forgone by the economy, as businessmen with idle capacity were reluctant to invest. Average labor productivity, which rises as overhead manage-

ment, clerical, and maintenance staffs are spread over a large output, and with investment in improved equipment, inevitably lagged during this period.

In short, a better record in achieving and maintaining full employment during the sixties than was achieved in the fifties can be expected to maintain or perhaps raise the rate of growth of potential above its present level, and the modest increase of three-tenths of a point necessary for the achievement of our 1970 goal is well within our grasp.

Thus far we have assumed that unemployment would fall at the peak of the present recovery to 4 percent and that, at cyclical peaks in the remainder of the decade, unemployment would not drop below 4 percent. But a 4 percent rate of unemployment is only an intermediate goal. A further source of growth from present levels would be a drop in unemployment at cyclical peaks to 3-3½ percent, for example. Such a development would make it possible to exceed the proposed target growth of 50 percent in 1970.

Between 1950 and 1960 the total labor force grew at an average annual rate of 1¼ percent in the United States. Demographic projections indicate that between 1960 and 1970 that rate will rise to 1¾ percent. Such an acceleration in the growth of the labor force adds to the difficulties of a full-employment policy. But the administration is determined to meet that problem in any case. Mere continuation of the 2 percent annual increase in productivity per worker will then imply an annual growth in potential of 3¾ percent, which again underlines the modesty of the proposed target.

Merely to maintain the already achieved rate of growth of productivity will require an increased volume of investment so that additional workers may be equipped with capital and so that capital per worker may increase at faster rates. Acceleration of the rate of growth of productivity will entail a rise in the fraction of GNP invested in private plant and equipment from the present 9-9½ percent to 10-10½ percent—a figure which was equaled or exceeded throughout the period 1947-57.

Our own sights are set even higher than that since it is our intent to move to an annual growth rate of potential output in excess of 4 percent.

Policies in the tax and monetary fields aimed at achieving an increased volume of investment are already part of the program of the Kennedy administration.

The other major components of a growth policy are the expansion of the amount and share of resources devoted to education in the broadest sense, and to scientific and technological research, the retraining of technologically displaced workers, public assistance for the redevelopment of depressed areas, and a liberalization of international trade on a reciprocal basis.

The carrying out of such policies will add to the growth potential of the American economy by amounts which cannot yet be estimated; but we expect the United States to be able to do its full share to meet the proposed growth target which we are discussing this afternoon.

Problems of Other OECD Countries

Now I am aware that the problems which may concern other members of the OECD in meeting the proposed 50 percent increase in our combined gross products are somewhat different, both in kind and degree, from those we face in the United States. On the other hand, I am also aware that several important OECD countries are currently growing at a rate much faster than is necessary to meet the proposed target and have already maintained this rate of growth for several years. On balance, therefore, the proposed target seems to us conservative.

It is my personal belief that the OECD countries will surpass the target by a substantial margin. I think that, in assessing the possibilities of attaining the proposed rate of growth, it is not enough merely to examine the growth potential of each member nation. We should not overlook the extra impetus to growth that should come from our working together for the achievement of a common target.

As our distinguished Secretary General [Thorvald Kristensen] eloquently said—last August in Oxford, I believe:

It is very much easier to take courageous, constructive, expansionist, liberal measures, if many countries do it at the same time, than if the individual country is doing it in isolation.

Now I have made these suggestions in support of a proposal that we set a growth target which

would call for an increase in the combined GNP's of the OECD countries by 50 percent between this year and the end of the decade. It is our understanding that certain of the delegations here feel that it would be more appropriate for us to set this target of a 50 percent increase, not in terms of the 9 years that remain from now to the end of the decade but in terms of the decade of the sixties. Well, we believe that the target that we have suggested is a reasonable one. We nevertheless feel that, if this body prefers the 10-year target, we would certainly interpose no objections to its adoption.

Let me say in closing, Mr. Chairman, that I do believe that the efforts which are envisaged by either the 9-year or the 10-year target are relatively modest; but I must emphasize that the ultimate purposes which we are facing here today are by no means modest. We have an opportunity to prove (not only by what we do this afternoon, but the way in which we carry out the steps necessary to the achievement of the goal that we may set) that our empirical mixture of public and private enterprise is far more dynamic and, simultaneously, more conducive to human well-being than any other economic arrangement that the world has devised. We have an opportunity to prove that personal freedom is compatible with vigorous economic advancement and that it can be sustained even in a world of change, uncertainty, and peril. We have an opportunity to reaffirm—both among ourselves and in our relations with less developed nations—a central thesis of our ethics, that self-interest is entirely consistent with a sincere devotion to the interests of others.

Finally, we have an opportunity to prove again what has been proved so many times in the past, that history contains no laws of inevitability and that the future belongs to whatever men and nations are willing to grasp it.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 798 dated November 18

The First Ministerial Council of the OECD, meeting in Paris on November 16 and 17 under the chairmanship of the Canadian Minister of Finance, the Honorable Donald M. Fleming, surveyed the economic prospects of the vast

community of member nations comprising more than five hundred million people in Europe and North America and examined its world responsibilities.

The Ministers noted the substantial economic growth that had taken place in most member countries during the past decade. They agreed on the desirability of establishing a target for further growth. Under conditions of price stability and the necessary provision for investment, rapid growth facilitates the harmonious development of world economy, helps to promote a liberal world trading system, provides a necessary foundation for rising living standards, and ensures a high level of employment. It will enable industrialized member countries to contribute more effectively to the development of less-advanced countries both through the provision of financial and technical assistance and through a widening of their export markets and the increase of their export revenues.

Accordingly the Ministers set as a collective target the attainment during the decade from 1960 to 1970 of a growth in real gross national product of fifty percent for the twenty member countries taken together. The rate of growth may vary from year to year and from country to country. Moreover, being a collective target, individual countries may fall short of or exceed it in varying degrees.

Each country will have to make its contribution to collective growth in accordance with its own special circumstances. This contribution will be supported and made more effective by simultaneous expansion in other countries. The setting of a joint target for economic growth is itself recognition of the increasing interdependence of the separate economies of the twenty member countries. Given their needs, it is desirable that member countries in the process of development should have a relatively higher rate of growth. A fifty percent increase in output during the decade will call for deliberate national economic policies and their coordination through the Organization's procedures of consultations and cooperation.

In this respect the Ministers put particular emphasis on the necessity of a proper equilibrium in the external payments of member countries as a condition for the fulfillment of the growth target mentioned above. It was therefore necessary to develop still further the close coordination of fi-

nancial and economic policies and the mutual sense of responsibility between deficit and surplus countries in order to attain the common objective of accelerated economic growth while further improving the international payments mechanism. The various means already available to relieve temporary pressures on particular currencies were of great value, but they should be further developed.

Price stability is of the highest importance in order to assure to the population the full benefit of economic growth and to maintain equilibrium in international payments. Excess demand should, therefore, be prevented and efforts made to improve productivity and labor mobility. The gains through higher productivity should be fairly distributed, and increases in the level of money incomes should be kept generally in line with increases in productivity, which alone provide the means to a durable increase in the standard of living. In countries with payments deficits it is particularly important that the competitive position is not undermined through cost increases. Liberal import policies are another means of assuring price stability. The surplus countries have a special responsibility to use this and other means available to them which contribute to both external and internal equilibrium.

The Ministers emphasized that a special effort must be made to promote growth in less-developed member countries and thus endeavor to reduce the very great disparities in incomes per head. In these countries there are great possibilities for achieving a higher standard of living through more intensive use of natural and human resources. They stressed their conviction that more investment and more training are necessary conditions for such a development. To induce a real increase in the inadequate growth rates of such member countries the Ministers instructed the Organization to encourage and assist such countries in their efforts, including the preparation and achievement of sound development plans.

In order to achieve the growth target, increasing use of scientific training and research is needed. Their utilization in agriculture and industry should be closely studied. The Organization should further develop its work in these fields.

The Ministers noted that, thanks to increased productivity and mechanization, agricultural production had risen considerably in the OECD

countries and they recognized that agriculture would also play an important role in attaining the collective growth target. The Ministers agreed that necessary adjustments within agriculture should be carefully studied. They thought that increased productivity within agriculture should contribute to general price stability. In addition, agriculture could, in many countries, make manpower available for the expansion of industry. In this connection the importance was recognized of insuring that the agricultural population should share in the rising standard of living resulting from economic growth. The Ministers agreed with the OECD Ministers of Agriculture meeting of October 1961 that agricultural policies should be the subject of continuous consultation and confrontation within the Organization in order to insure that industrial and agricultural production developed harmoniously.

The Ministers were determined that increased production should lead to a significant increase in the aid to the less-developed countries. In 1960, the aggregate flow of resources, both public and private, from member countries and Japan, a member of the Organization's Development Assistance Committee, amounted to about \$7.5 billion. The Ministers agreed that a further increase of development assistance was needed and they welcomed the intention of the Development Assistance Committee to institute, beginning in 1962, an annual review of aid efforts and policies of its member countries. The main purpose should be to increase the efforts and to adapt them better to the needs and circumstances of the recipient countries through exchange of experience regarding bilateral aid. The Ministers expressed the desire that the Development Assistance Committee should encourage greater cooperation among donor countries in their bilateral aid efforts and that a common approach should be applied increasingly to specific problems of economic development assistance. They also recognized the need for full cooperation with and support of multilateral institutions providing development aid, and they welcomed the work going on to define measures to encourage private capital exports to less-developed countries.

The Ministers recognized that successful economic expansion in less-developed countries can best be achieved through carefully prepared programs based on an assessment of needs and re-

sources. They, therefore, welcome individual and regional efforts by less-developed countries in drawing up such programs. The Ministers instructed the Organization to study the functions and structure of the contemplated OECD development center which could help, in coordination with existing institutions, to meet the urgent need for more knowledge and for qualified persons to assist in the development efforts.

The Ministers stressed the importance of reducing barriers to the exchange of goods and services, in particular on the part of the more industrialized countries, as a means of promoting economic growth and of providing expanding markets. They emphasized the need to seek ways and means, both in the OECD and in other international forums, to reduce barriers to trade among OECD countries and between OECD countries and the rest of the world. The main instrument of the Organization in achieving this aim should be periodic confrontations of trade policies. The Ministers underlined the significance of the negotiations between the European economic community and other European countries. The arrangements adopted should safeguard the legitimate interests of other countries. They expressed their satisfaction that the countries engaged in negotiations were willing to keep the OECD informed of the progress of the negotiations. The aim of the Organization should be to contribute to the maximum freedom of trade and to enable the less-developed countries to obtain increasing export revenues.

In conclusion, the Ministers noted that these measures were but first steps in a collective effort that must extend increasingly beyond the relationships among their own countries and the material well-being of their citizens. Member countries will pursue together the three objectives of the OECD convention pertaining to economic growth, aid and trade in order to ensure a sound expanding free world economy.

AID Awards Contract to Nigeria

The Department of State announced on November 29 (press release 823) that the Agency for International Development has awarded its first contract to assist industrial growth in an under-developed nation. At the request of the Nigerian

Government, the Agency on November 20 signed a \$1.9 million, 2-year agreement to help the Nigerian Government expand its economy, create new industries, and stimulate private investment. The contract has been placed with Arthur D. Little, Inc., a research and consulting firm of Cambridge, Mass.

The new project launches AID's first joint effort for a comprehensive industrial development program ever made in tropical Africa. Experts of the Little firm will work with officials of the Federal and Regional Governments of Nigeria in making detailed studies designed to identify and evaluate specific industrial opportunities for private investment. The Nigerian Government will use these studies in developing programs to attract private capital from both Nigerian and outside sources. In addition, the American advisers will be working with local entrepreneurs in three regional development centers to improve their product lines, marketing techniques, and financial structures.

United States To Cooperate With FAO In Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign

Remarks by President Kennedy¹

White House press release dated November 22

It is a great pleasure and honor to welcome to the White House again Mrs. Woodrow Wilson and Miss Marian Anderson as representatives of the United States Freedom-From-Hunger Foundation.

It is fitting that on tomorrow, Thanksgiving Day, the United States will launch its freedom-from-hunger campaign in cooperation with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.² As the Pilgrims gave thanks more than three centuries ago for a bountiful harvest, so we give thanks in 1961 for the blessings of our agriculture and the continued opportunity that the

¹ Made at the White House on Nov. 22 at a ceremony announcing the appointment of 33 members of the United States Freedom-From-Hunger Foundation, which will spearhead U.S. participation in the 5-year Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. For a list of the members of the Foundation, see White House press release dated Nov. 22.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1960, p. 94, and July 18, 1960, p. 117.

great productivity of our farms gives us in sharing our food with the world's hungry.

President Woodrow Wilson responded to that opportunity in 1914, when food was sent to Europe. The American people have answered this call before, in all parts of the world, and they answer it now. Since last January, under the Food-for-Peace Program directed by Mr. [George] McGovern, nearly 28 million tons of food have been programed for shipment abroad.

The challenge of world hunger is one that we must meet, knowing that the burden is greater today than it has ever been before. But it is heartening to know that we are now joined in a worldwide alliance, the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, to eliminate hunger from the earth.

As long as there are hungry families—mothers, fathers, and children—through the world, we cannot possibly believe or feel that our great agricultural production, in any sense, is a burden. It is a great asset, not only for ourselves but for people all over the world; and I think that, instead of using the term "surpluses," and regarding it, in a sense, as a failure, we should regard it as one of the great evidences of our country's capacity and also as a great resource in order to demonstrate our concern for our fellow men.

As I have said, as long as any of them are hungry tomorrow, I am sure that Americans will not sit down at their table without hoping that we can do more to aid those who sit at no table.

President Requests Investigation of Duty on Cotton Imports

White House press release dated November 21

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Ben D. Dorfman, Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission.

NOVEMBER 21, 1961

DEAR MR. DORFMAN: I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that there is reason to believe that articles or materials wholly or in part of cotton are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the programs or operations undertaken by the Depart-

ment of Agriculture with respect to cotton or products thereof, or to reduce substantially the amount of cotton processed in the United States from cotton or products thereof with respect to which such programs or operations are being undertaken.

The Tariff Commission is requested to make an immediate investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, to determine whether a fee equivalent to the per pound export subsidy rate on the cotton content of imported articles and materials wholly or in part of cotton is necessary to prevent the imports of such articles from rendering or tending to render ineffective or materially interfering with the Department's programs for cotton and cotton products, or from reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from cotton or products thereof, with respect to which such programs are being undertaken.

The Commission's investigation and report should be completed as soon as practicable.

A copy of the Secretary's letter is enclosed.¹

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

Export of Ball Bearing Machines to Russia. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. February 28, 1961. 266 pp.

Wetlands Acquisition and Oil Pollution of the Sea. Hearing before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 2187, a bill to implement the provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, and S. 2175 and H.R. 7391, bills to promote the conservation of migratory waterfowl by the acquisition of wetlands and other essential waterfowl habitat, and for other purposes. July 31, 1961. 40 pp.

Organizing for National Security: State, Defense, and the National Security Council. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Government Operations Committee. Part IX. August 1-24, 1961. 165 pp.

Report of the Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a report for the period July 1 to December 31, 1960. H. Doc. 241. September 14, 1961. 47 pp.

¹ Not printed.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Adjourned During November 1961

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 8th Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 23-Nov. 11
UNESCO Executive Board: 60th Session	Paris	Oct. 25-Nov. 29
2d International Film Festival of India	New Delhi	Oct. 27-Nov. 2
U.N. ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East: 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 27-Nov. 10
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Conditions of Sale for Cereals	Geneva	Oct. 30-Nov. 3
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on River Law	Geneva	Oct. 30-Nov. 3
FAO Council: 36th Session	Rome	Oct. 30-Nov. 3
ILO Meeting of Consultants on the Problems of Young Workers	Geneva	Oct. 30-Nov. 4
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 30-Nov. 10
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 13th Meeting	Kuala Lumpur	Oct. 30-Nov. 18
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	Nov. 1 (1 day)
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 1 (1 day)
GATT Provisional Cotton Textile Committee: Statistical Subcommittee	Geneva	Nov. 1-2
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Organization and Operation of Industrial Estates	Madras	Nov. 1-11
Subcommittee of the Heads of Examining Patent Offices of the Council of Europe	Strasbourg	Nov. 2-6
FAO Conference: 11th Session	Rome	Nov. 4-24
CENTO Military Committee	Washington	Nov. 6-7
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Nov. 6-10
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 6th Session	Geneva	Nov. 6-10
Committee of Experts on Patents of the Council of Europe	Strasbourg	Nov. 7-11
Inter-American Commission of Women: Executive Committee	Washington	Nov. 9 (1 day)
ILO Governing Body: 150th Session	Geneva	Nov. 13-25
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 14-15
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 16-17
OECD Nonferrous Metals Committee	Paris	Nov. 17 (1 day)
SEATO Committee of Economic Experts	Bangkok	Nov. 20-24
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group	Geneva	Nov. 20-24
IMCO Expert Working Group on Pollution of the Sea by Oil	London	Nov. 21-22
FAO Council: 37th Session	Rome	Nov. 25 (1 day)
International Rubber Study Group: 68th Meeting of Management Committee	London	Nov. 27-29
GATT Ministerial Meeting	Geneva	Nov. 27-30

In Session as of November 30, 1961

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question	Geneva	May 16-
United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session	New York	Sept. 19-
GATT Contracting Parties: 19th Session	Geneva	Nov. 13-
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting	Paris	Nov. 14-
ICAO South American-South Atlantic Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services/Communications Meeting	Lima	Nov. 14-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Training Seminar on Trade Promotion	New Delhi	Nov. 20-
International Wheat Council: 33d Session	London	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 4th Session	Tokyo	Nov. 27-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 30, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

2d U.N. ECAFE/WMO International Seminar on Field Methods and Equipment Used in Hydrology and Hydrometeorology.	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting of Study Group for Projections on Agricultural Problems.	Geneva	Nov. 27-
Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control: 2d Meeting.	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 27-
Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (resumed session).	Geneva	Nov. 28-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Gas Problems	Geneva	Nov. 29-
ITU Roundtable Discussions on Revisions of Radio Regulations and Schedule of Conferences.	Geneva	Nov. 30-
IA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Expert Level	Washington	Nov. 29-

Working Toward a World Without War

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

The earlier portions of the remarks by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union were devoted to a repetition of the Soviet version of the problem of Berlin and of Germany. While this is quite irrelevant, I must remind the committee for the record that it is clear that the Berlin problem is a problem created by the Soviet Union for its own purposes. It is the Soviet Union which is trying to breach the agreements on Berlin. It is the Soviet Union which has illegally erected a wall which divides that city. It is the Soviet Union which is seeking to perpetuate the division of Germany.

Regarding the Soviet desire to liquidate what they call the vestiges of the war, I would remind the committee that the Soviet Union regards as vestiges of the war only what is not to its liking, that is, the Western presence in Berlin, the freedom of movement within that city, and the hope for the reunification of Germany. It evidently does not regard as a vestige of the war such things as the division of Germany and of Berlin.

It calls this a situation brought about by life itself. But this problem of Germany is not before us today, and I have no intention of pressing

this matter further but rather propose to turn my attention to the item on our agenda, which is disarmament.

If I understood Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, he said that the American plan² was ambiguous about the production, for example, of arms and fissionable materials. I would invite his attention to paragraph c of stage III, which reads as follows:

The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the United Nations Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

But such misstatements will be dealt with when the details of disarmament are discussed.

I agree with Mr. Zorin that this subject of disarmament is the most important question before this committee and, indeed, before this General Assembly. I only wish that his misleading and frequently abusive speech had produced something new and some encouragement for real disarmament. I earnestly hope that on examination

² For text of a U.S. proposal entitled "Declaration on Disarmament: A Programme for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," which was submitted to the General Assembly on Sept. 25, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 15 (U.S. delegation press release 3837).

the draft resolution which he has presented to me just now will give us some greater hope than the speech portends.

War is one of our oldest institutions. It is deeply imbedded in the traditions, the folkways, the literature, even the values of most all countries. It has engaged talented men and produced national heroes. At the same time, civilized men and women for centuries past have abhorred the immorality of organized killing of men by men. Yet let us confess at once, to our common shame, that this deep sense of revulsion has not averted wars, nor shortened one by a day.

While I do not say that all wars have been started for unworthy purposes, let us also confess—morality to the side—that most all past wars have served to promote what was conceived to be the national or princely or religious interests of those who fought them—or at least those who won them. For in past wars there have been winners as well as losers, the victors and the vanquished, the decorated and the dead. In the end, valuable real estate and other riches have changed hands. Thrones have been won, regimes transferred, rule extended, religions and ideologies imposed, empires gained and lost, aggressions halted or advanced. Thus wars in the past have sometimes been a means of settling international disputes, of changing political control, of inducing social transformation, and even of stimulating science and technology.

And I suppose that on moral grounds it is only a difference of degree whether millions are killed or only thousands—whether the victims include children in the debris of a big city building or only young men lying on a battlefield in the countryside. Nor has war been a very efficient way of settling disputes. Yesterday's enemies are today's friends. First the victor pays for destruction of his enemy, then for reconstruction of his friend.

But war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in the past—not in degree but in kind. It is this which seems so difficult to grasp. Thermonuclear war cannot serve anyone's national interest—no matter how moral or immoral that interest may be, no matter how just or unjust, no matter how noble or ignoble—regardless of the nation's ideology, faith, or social system.

It is no satisfaction to suggest that the issue of morality in war thus has become academic. Yet

this is the fact, and perhaps it will serve to clarify the dialog of war and peace. For we can now free our collective conscience of nice ethical distinctions and face the stark, amoral fact that war has ceased to be practical, that no nation can contemplate resort to modern war except in defense against intolerable exaction or aggression. Therefore we must abolish war to save our collective skins. For as long as this nuclear death dance continues, millions—tens of millions—perhaps hundreds of millions are living on borrowed time.

I suggested a moment ago that war is such an ancient institution, so deeply entrenched in tradition, that it requires a strenuous intellectual effort to imagine a world free from war. So it does, and I shall have more to say about this later. But I submit that the alternative effort is to imagine a world at the end of another war, when great areas and great places have been turned into radioactive wasteland, when millions upon millions of people are already dead while debris from those great mushroom clouds drifts ghoulishly over the living, when great parts of our institutions, ideologies, faiths, and beliefs—even our art and literature—lie smashed in the smoke and rubble of material destruction.

I submit that, however difficult the vision of a world *without war* may be, it is not only a happier but an easier vision to imagine than one of a world *after war*. In any event, we must choose between them.

It is against this bleak reality that we meet once again, Mr. Chairman, to take up the subject of disarmament.

History of Disarmament Negotiations

The story of man's efforts to do away with armaments is a long and sorry one. At various times this or that measure of disarmament has seemed within our grasp. My own country has a proud record in this respect. We supported the two Hague conferences. We took the lead in naval disarmament after World War I. We did our utmost to make the comprehensive Disarmament Conference of 1932 a success. And after World War II we stripped our armed forces to the bone in the hope and belief that we had made some progress toward a peaceful world.

Disarmament was one of the first orders of business for the United Nations. Fifteen years ago, at the first meeting of this Assembly, the United

States delegation, of which I was a member, made a proposal as revolutionary as the scientific discovery which prompted it. At that time we proposed to destroy the few atomic weapons which the United States alone possessed, to outlaw forever the manufacture of such weapons, to place the development of atomic energy in all its forms under the full control of the United Nations, and to turn over to this Organization all facilities and all information bearing on atomic science and technology; all this to prevent an atomic arms race.

The world does not need to be reminded here of the tragic consequences of the rejection of that initiative of a decade and a half ago. Since then there has been a long series of commissions, committees, subcommittees, and conferences, inside the United Nations and out, which have tried to deal with the question of general disarmament and first steps toward it.

After the Soviet delegation walked out of the 10-power general disarmament talks in June 1960,³ our main hopes were focused on the 3-power negotiations at Geneva for a treaty to ban the testing of atomic weapons. After 2½ years of patient negotiations, in the course of which significant progress was made, the United States and Britain tabled a comprehensive treaty⁴ which they had every reason to believe would meet the remaining points of difference with the Soviet Union. The United States and Britain were prepared to sign a comprehensive treaty at once—and still are.

Then on the last day of last August came the shocking news that the Soviet Union would break the moratorium which it had advocated and vowed never to break. The United States and Britain immediately offered to agree with the Soviet Union to ban at once all tests in the atmosphere without inspection—to spare mankind the hazards of radioactive fallout.⁵ We regret that, like the Baruch proposals, this offer was also rejected by the Soviet Union.⁶

Since that time the Soviet Union has carried on a series of nuclear weapons tests with unprecedented pollution of the atmosphere. It was climaxed by the explosion of history's most appalling weapon, a superbomb of more than 50

megatons, or more than 50 million tons of TNT. This weapon's destructive power exceeds any known military requirements. So its principal purpose is to serve the political strategy of terror.

This action was taken in disregard of pleas from governments and peoples all over the non-Communist world—and, finally, in defiance of an unprecedented resolution of the United Nations General Assembly supported by 87 nations.⁷

To all our pleas the Soviet Union, for months past, has invariably replied that it will agree to a ban on nuclear tests only as part of an agreement for general and complete disarmament. By insisting on this link between an issue which we had nearly resolved and the difficult issue of disarmament, the Soviet Union has tightened the knot and made it harder than ever to untie. Only last Thursday the General Assembly rejected the idea of delaying a test ban treaty by calling once again, by a vote of 71 to 11, for the urgent resumption of negotiations to outlaw nuclear tests.⁸

So let me point out at once to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that it is his country alone which insists on making a genuine and effective test ban dependent on the achievement of general disarmament. And because it does so insist, the Soviet Union, as we now move into the debate on general and complete disarmament, becomes doubly answerable to world opinion. The world will look to them in this debate to answer not one but two burning questions: Do you or don't you want disarmament? and—once again—Do you or don't you want an end to nuclear weapons, in fact or just in rhetoric?

And yet there is this much connection between the two subjects: The advance in weapons technology as a result of tests must ultimately increase our common peril. It is a measure of the tragic failure of all our efforts to reach disarmament agreements. And it is a compelling challenge to my Government to try again—to make a fresh start—to insist with the utmost urgency that the weapons which have made war an obsolete institution be laid aside quickly before others are forced in self-defense to carry this insensate race yet another stage toward ultimate folly.

No doubt there are those who will ask how we can dare realistically to speak of disarmament today, when the winds of conflict blow all about us.

⁷ For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 13, 1961, p. 817.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 936.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

⁵ For background and text of a joint U.S.-U.K. proposal of Sept. 1, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515.

There are those who will ask whether this is mere wishful thinking, whether this is more than escapism.

To that we would reply: Escapism, no; escape, yes. For man *must* escape, not in wishful dreams but in hard reality. We *must* escape from this spiral of fear, from the outmoded illusion that lasting security for peoples can be found by balancing out the wildly destructive power in the hands of their governments.

As President Kennedy said to the General Assembly on September 25:⁹

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

President Kennedy informed the General Assembly then that the United States has prepared a new set of proposals for general and complete disarmament. These proposals were circulated subsequently to all members.¹⁰

He also outlined my Government's conception of what is needed to create a world without war. It is a view which embraces first steps, subsequent steps, and the ultimate goal at the end of the road. And it goes far beyond the technical steps in arms reduction. It requires the reservation of outer space for peaceful uses. It includes international programs for economic and social progress. And it insists especially upon the essential need to build up the machinery of peace while we tear down the machinery of war—that these must go hand in hand, that these, indeed, must be but two parts of a single program.

For in a world without arms, military power would be taken out of the hands of nations; but other forms of power would remain—and mostly in the hands of the same states which are the most powerful military states today.

Conflicting ideologies would still be with us.

Political struggles would still take place.

Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pressures from within and without.

Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an instrument of, national foreign policies.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 650.

And the world would still be the scene of peaceful transformations—for it cannot and should not remain static.

Let us be clear about all this: Disarmament alone will not purify the human race of the last vestiges of greed, ambition, and brutality, of false pride and the love of power. Nor will it cleanse every last national leader of the least impulse to international lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pretend to foresee such a paradise on earth—even an earth without arms. But it would be a safer earth, where the contest and conflict could be waged in peace.

Clearly, then, disarmament will not usher in utopia. But it will prevent the wanton wastage of life and the wholesale destruction of material resources. And it will free the energies of man to engage in beneficent pursuits. How much could be done to improve the conditions of man—his education, his health, his nutrition, and his housing—if even a small portion of the funds and the ingenuity of man now devoted to improving the art of killing were transferred to improving the art of living!

Who would keep the peace in a disarmed world? How would our disputes get settled when arms have been taken away?

If we can answer these questions, we are much nearer to a solution of the problem of disarmament. For these questions open up the unexplored ground between first steps toward disarmament and the vision at the end of the road. And the vision of a world free from war will remain a utopian illusion until means for keeping the peace lend it reality.

It therefore seems clear to me that the only way to general and complete disarmament lies along two parallel paths which must be traveled together. One leads to the absence of arms, the other to the presence of adequate machinery for keeping the peace. As we destroy an obsolete institution for the settlement of disputes, we must create new institutions for the settlement of disputes—and simultaneously.

Let me repeat for emphasis. We do not hold the vision of a world without conflict. We do hold the vision of a world without war—and this inevitably requires an alternative system for coping with conflict. We cannot have one without the other. But if we travel the two roads to-

gether, if we build as we destroy, we can solve the technical problems of dismantling the vast apparatus of war.

U.S. Proposal for Disarmament

Let me come now to the United States proposals for dismantling the towering and costly machinery of war.

To begin with, the United States emphatically embraces the commitment to general and complete disarmament. We proclaim the goal—without reservation—and in the shortest possible span of time. And we take this terminology to mean exactly what it says: the general and complete disarmament of all national forces capable of international aggression and the safe disposal of all their arms.

It is interesting to note that the conference of nonaligned nations which met in Belgrade in September of this year¹¹ demonstrates how widely shared our goal is. I quote their words:

The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, the United States proposal is, indeed, a "radical" one.

It calls for large reductions of armaments even in the first stages—both conventional and nuclear armaments.

It calls for an end to production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and the transfer of such materials from existing stocks for non-weapons use.

The program calls for a stop in the further development of independent national nuclear capabilities.

It calls for the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

It calls for an end to the production of such delivery vehicles.

It calls for the abolition of chemical, biological, and radioactive weapons.

In short, the United States program calls for the total elimination of national capacity to make

international war. And, to insure that all these steps are actually carried out by each side, every step of the way, the plan calls for the creation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations.

If the United States program is comprehensive, it also is flexible. It does not pretend to be the final word—nor would we wish it to be. We expect it to be examined exhaustively, to be altered and to be improved. It certainly is not perfect; but it can stand up to close scrutiny, for it has been prepared at great pains and in good faith. It is presented in dead earnest and in the conviction that propaganda on the subject of disarmament is a cynical and cruel mockery of man's deepest hope.

Need for Adequate Verification

At one point and one point alone the United States is, and will remain, inflexible: This is on the familiar question of verification, on the indispensable need for the world to know that disarmament agreements are, in fact, being carried out. Because of the confusion that persists on this point, I must dwell upon it for a moment.

First of all, verification must be understood not as a technical point but as a fundamental principle—as the essential condition for any significant progress in disarmament—as its *sine qua non*. To pretend that there is enough confidence between the major armed powers to accept disarmament without verification is to deny the existence of the arms race itself. For the arms race is nothing if not living proof of the absence of mutual trust, and confidence has been rudely shaken by recent events.

I will say quite bluntly that mistrust exists on our side, and how could it be otherwise? The hostility of Soviet leaders toward my country, its institutions, and its way of life is proclaimed, documented, and demonstrated in a thousand ways. Yet we earnestly seek agreement with them—through diplomatic methods and through agreements recorded in words and deeds. So we may be excused, it seems to me, if we are wary of agreements deeply involving our national security with a nation whose recent leader wrote this: "Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood."

¹¹ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

These are the words of the late Marshal Stalin. I am aware that his former absolute authority has been subject to a certain reevaluation recently. But the present Premier of the Soviet Union, who served Stalin so loyally, still proclaims his indebtedness to Lenin. And after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenin said this:

We must demobilize the army as quickly as possible, because it is a sick organ; meanwhile we will assist the Finnish Revolution. Yes, of course we are violating the Treaty; we have violated it thirty or forty times.

More recently we have seen wholesale violation of agreements pledging self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe—not to mention so contemporary an event as the erection of a wall through the middle of a city in violation of a postwar agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mention these matters to belabor the dead, nor to rub salt in wounds both old and fresh, nor to becloud the disarmament problem with irrelevant questions. They are not irrelevant, because there can be no disarmament without agreement and because clear warnings and harsh experience have taught us to insist upon independent and international verification of agreements with the Soviet Union.

Our deepest hope—our most fervent prayer—is for proof that this acquired lack of trust will no longer be justified. Meanwhile we do not ask that those who are suspicious of us take us at our word. We offer to them the same guarantees that we have the right and duty to demand of them. We offer to submit to verification procedures under international control at each step of disarmament.

Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has no interest in controls for the sake of controls. We do not wish to buy control or to trade something for it. We have no stake in playing the host to teams of foreign inspectors within our borders. But there is no other way to dispel mistrust, to exorcise suspicion, to begin to build the mutual confidence upon which peaceful cooperation ultimately depends.

So we accept the need for adequate verification procedures. We recognize the right of others to assure themselves that we in fact do what we say we shall do with respect to disarmament.

But in the meantime we must find a basis for workable agreement.

Last spring, as delegates here will recall, this committee agreed to postpone further discussion

of disarmament so that the United States and the Soviet Union could exchange views "on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition is to be agreed upon."¹²

Beginning on June 19 and ending on September 19, meeting in Moscow, Washington, and New York, representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States discussed these two questions.¹³ The results of these talks were reported to the General Assembly by the United States and the Soviet Union in a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which is before this committee, document A/4879.¹⁴

This report shows that, although our conversations did not bring complete success, neither did they bring complete failure. We were unable to agree on a forum for negotiations. But we did agree on a set of principles to guide negotiations on disarmament.

The U.S. Government welcomed this limited agreement with some hope, especially since the Soviet and American delegates agreed quite explicitly to the implementation of all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under international control. This looked like a very bright spot on a dark horizon—perhaps a real breakthrough toward a world without arms.

But, Mr. Chairman, our hopes have been restrained by the Soviet refusal to follow through on this aspect of the agreed principles. In his address to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on September 26, Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] made the following statement:

After all, no one knows right now what armaments and armed forces the states possess. This is quite normal. For perfectly obvious reasons states do not reveal that kind of information and the same situation will endure after the implementation of disarmament measures provided for in this or that state, pending the completion of general and complete disarmament.

What can this possibly mean? The meaning is that to our Soviet colleagues inspection should apply to the destruction of armaments—but not to existing armaments or the production of new ones.

¹² For a statement by Mr. Stevenson, see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 568.

¹³ For texts of joint communiques concerning the talks, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57, and July 17, 1961, p. 106.

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

Apparently we are being asked to establish an elaborate international inspection force simply to witness the destruction of certain quantities and categories of arms, with no knowledge of what remains—to watch while one weapon is junked without seeing whether two others are in production to take its place, perhaps in reality to certify the disposal of inventories of obsolete equipment. I am reminded of the story of the little boy who was showing off his conjuring tricks and said to his parents: "I am going to do some magic for you, but you have to promise not to look."

The Soviet position thus seems to be the same as it was when the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, addressed a letter¹⁵ to the U.S. disarmament representative, Mr. [John J.] McCloy, on September 21, at the conclusion of the bilateral Soviet-American disarmament negotiations. Mr. McCloy had noted¹⁶ that the Soviet Union had refused to accept, in the Statement of Agreed Principles, a clause reading

Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Now, Mr. President, this sentence seemed to us to represent a *sine qua non* for any effective verification and control. But in his reply Mr. Zorin insisted that such control—that is, control over the armed forces and armaments retained by states at any given stage of disarmament—would turn into what he called an international system of recognized espionage.

If it is the position of the Soviet Union that verification of agreed levels of armaments retained by states under a disarmament plan is espionage, then clearly there can be no general and complete disarmament agreement, for armaments destroyed are of less concern to us than armaments retained. It is the latter and not the former which states attacked in war would have to fear. No matter how many weapons were destroyed, it would be the weapons which were left that would be utilized in a military operation. This is a stumbling block which could be crucial. Unless we can get a clear and satisfactory agreement on this particular point, it is difficult to envisage very substantial progress in disarmament negotiations.

¹⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1961, p. 767.

¹⁶ For text of Mr. McCloy's letter to Mr. Zorin, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 595.

For under the Soviet concept of disarmament inspection, the arms race could continue and the arsenals of war could be larger and deadlier at the end of the first stage of "disarmament" than at the beginning. In short, we would disarm in public and be perfectly free to rearm in secret.

Mr. Chairman, this interpretation turns common sense on its head and makes mockery of logic. This turns reason into gibberish, meaning into nonsense, words into water.

The purpose of disarmament is to abolish war precisely by abolishing the means of making war—which is to say, the armaments and armed forces with which wars are fought. If disarmament does not mean the reduction of the actual levels of armament, it has no meaning at all.

I can only hope that Soviet delegates will not persist in their attitude. If I have misunderstood the position I shall be happy to be informed, and we can go forward. For on their face the principles agreed between the United States and the U.S.S.R. do provide sound and workable guidelines for serious disarmament negotiations, and I prefer to think that they represent an important step in the right direction.

Question of the Proper Forum

This brings us to the question of the proper forum. During our exchanges with the Soviet Union on this point we of the United States tried to reach agreement on a formula which could then be recommended to the other states concerned. Our position on the exact representation was and still is flexible. These proposals can be found in document A/4880.¹⁷ In fact we suggested four possible alternative solutions, but to no avail. The Soviet Union continued to insist on a formula which we felt was restrictive and based on artificial and arbitrary criteria.

Quite frankly, we have grown a little weary of the repeated Soviet demands for changes in the negotiating forum on disarmament. The history of the disarmament talks is full of them. The Ten-Nation Committee was established at Soviet insistence. This was because they seemed to set great store by what they called "parity" in numbers of delegations between their side and the West—even though on the Western side there are several major powers and on their side there has been only one. Then when the Soviets found that

¹⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 591.

the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee were not to their liking, they abruptly broke off the talks and demanded an entirely new forum.

Now the latest Soviet proposal for altering the forum into three "groups" is all too reminiscent of the Soviet view, which is quite extraneous to disarmament and quite unacceptable to many other nations: the view that the world can be neatly divided into three so-called "blocs."

The United States recognizes that all nations have a vital stake in the cause of peace and disarmament. On that basis we supported in past years the expansion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to include all members of the United Nations. We recognize, in fact, that the world outside the old Ten-Nation Committee is much larger and more populous than the countries represented in that Committee. Therefore, if we do expand its membership, we would be inclined to include additional members to insure the representation and the advice of the world at large. This is the sense of our proposal to add 10 members to the Ten-Nation Committee which was carrying on disarmament negotiations in 1960, on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.

We hope the Soviet Union is ready to discuss with us the composition of the negotiating forum. I am sure most of the members of the committee would welcome an agreement on this point which would enable us to get started on the substantive negotiations which have been interrupted ever since the U.S.S.R. decided it did not like the 10-nation forum it had demanded. The world wants disarmament, and so do we, and not everlasting negotiations about the number of negotiators.

While we consider the first moves toward disarmament, we can begin right away to strengthen our machinery for keeping the peace. We can do this without hampering our efforts to reach agreement on disarmament. Every step to improve the machinery of peace will make it easier to take the next step in destroying the machinery of war.

We need not even be at a loss as to where to begin or how to proceed. The experience of the United Nations itself gives us a starting point and a guideline. In its earliest years the United Nations had successful experience with mediation and conciliation. It defended collective security and the independence of small nations against their assailants in Korea. Then, at a time of urgent need in the Middle East, the United Nations acquired an effective power to police the

lines of an armistice agreement. At another time of great need—in the Congo—it added an effective power to use force, if necessary, to restore order and to prevent a civil war. Out of such emergencies, the United Nations is becoming a stronger instrument for keeping the peace.

It will have to be much stronger still. Our task now is to strengthen, refine, and develop more fully the peacekeeping structure of the United Nations.

We can begin by drawing lessons from the United Nations' most recent experience in the Congo. From this operation it is not difficult to see that effectiveness in such peacemaking missions depends in large measure on four things: first, the ready availability and mobility of national units; second, their discipline and training and capacity to work with contingents of other nationalities; third, the length of their commitment; and, fourth, a clear chain of command flowing from United Nations Headquarters.

Improving U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery

When the United Nations is so often pitted in a race against time, we risk a dangerous vacuum during the interval while military forces are being assembled. And we further risk a dangerous erosion in the political and moral authority of the United Nations if troops trained for national forces are thrust without special training into situations unique to the purposes and methods of the United Nations, or if such troops are either kept on the job without rotation, are precipitately withdrawn when no replacements are at hand, or are insufficiently supported for lack of adequate financial resources.

We are all deeply in the debt of those officers and men who have served and are serving the cause of peace under the United Nations flag. We must proceed without delay to strengthen the context in which they act in this pioneering work of the United Nations as the guardian of peace.

The United States has suggested that all nations indicate the kind and quality of military units they might be prepared to send for service with the United Nations. My own country has provided very important logistic support for both UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] in the Middle East and the United Nations Forces in the Congo. We now suggest that member countries make available to the United Nations an inventory of the forces, equipment, and logistic support which they

would be prepared to put at the disposal of the United Nations for peace-preserving functions.

But to commit such facilities on paper is not enough. The functions of a United Nations Force are likely to be different from those of national forces. The United States believes that national units should be specially trained for the special character of United Nations operations. Recent United Nations experience should be studied so manuals can be prepared to assist the United Nations in officer training and to help member countries in training noncommissioned personnel.

Such steps would strengthen the United Nations' capacity to serve as an international police force. But a stronger and better organized police force would be needed only when threats to peace have reached dangerous proportions. The police force, therefore, must be supplemented with improved machinery for settling disputes before they reach an explosive stage. Our task, here again, is to build on the existing resources of the United Nations, including the International Court of Justice, and to avail ourselves more fully of the potentials for action within these existing resources.

The Secretary-General may wish to present to the United Nations members his own ideas for the expansion and improvement of United Nations machinery for observation, factfinding, conciliation, mediation, and adjudication. He undoubtedly will wish to make use of senior members of his staff in his conciliation activities. The political organs themselves may wish on occasion to avail themselves of the services of *rapporteurs*.

Moves such as these—and I hope other members will have other suggestions—would permit us to get on with the job of creating the kind of peace-keeping machinery that will be essential for dealing with conflicts in a world free from war. And we can start them at once—even without waiting for agreement on disarmament.

Taking the First Steps

Every such move will help to reduce danger, help to lower distrust, help to blunt fear. The way to start is to start; and a good place to start is ready to hand. I refer to the proposed treaty whose objective it is to outlaw further testing of atomic devices in space, in the atmosphere, on the ground, or under the ground or the water, which is still tabled at Geneva. We are flexible about first steps; we are adamant only on the point that we begin at once—immediately—to disarm.

U.N. Resolution on Disarmament¹

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a result of negotiations between them, that general and complete disarmament should be accomplished and their agreement on the principles which should guide disarmament negotiations,

Noting that the two Governments are desirous of resuming disarmament negotiations in an appropriate body, whose composition is yet to be agreed upon,

Considering it essential that these two principal parties should agree to and accept a negotiating body,

Having regard to the success of negotiations between these two parties resulting in the emergence of an agreement on principles,

1. *Urges* the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory;

2. *Expresses the hope* that such negotiations will be started without delay and will lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to report to the General Assembly, before the conclusion of its sixteenth session, on the results of such negotiations.

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1660 (XVI); unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 28.

Mr. Chairman, we can begin at once to disarm. To start now in no sense limits or postpones the goal of general and complete disarmament; indeed, this is the way to reach it faster. For some steps can be taken sooner than others, without disadvantage to any nation or groups of nations.

Let no one doubt our seriousness. Six weeks ago the President of our nation presented in person to this session of the General Assembly the boldest and most comprehensive plan for disarmament that my nation has ever offered to the world. Since then he has signed into a law an act creating a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,¹⁸ directly under his authority and containing an array of expert talent whose counterpart I would be very happy to see in a similar agency in the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 646.

Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, it is extremely difficult for the mind to grasp a clear vision of a world without arms, for it is a condition totally foreign to the human experience. But as I also said earlier, it is even more difficult to envision a world turned to a radioactive wasteland—which may well be the alternative. Difficult as it is, then, we must grasp the easier and happier vision.

And I do think we can see, however dimly, the general outlines of such a world. A world disarmed would not be utopia, but one suddenly blessed by freedom from war. It would not usher in world government, but the world community would have the capacity to keep the peace. It would not end national sovereignty, but the sovereign right to commit national suicide would be yielded up forever.

A disarmed world would still be a world of great diversity, in which no one nation could seriously pretend to have the wit and wisdom to manage mankind.

It would be a world in which ideas, for the first time, could compete on their own merits without the possibility of their imposition by force of arms.

It would be a world in which men could turn their talents to an agenda of progress and justice for all mankind in the second half of the 20th century.

In short, it would not be a perfect world, but a world both safer and more exhilarating for us all to live in.

There is nothing inherently impossible in creating the conditions for a world without war. Our basic problems are not technical, mechanistic, or administrative. The basic question is whether every nation will agree to abandon the means to coerce others by force.

If they will not, the arms race will go on. For those who love freedom and have the power to defend it will not be coerced. And, uncertain as it is, free people prefer to live on borrowed time than to yield to terror.

Conceivably the world could survive on this perpetual brink of universal disaster. Conceivably fortune would spare us from the fatal act of a lunatic, the miscalculation of an uninformed leader, the false step of a nervous young sentry.

But on behalf of my Government and my people I propose that this Assembly set the world on the road toward freedom from war. And I propose that this committee take the first steps by approving a negotiating forum, endorsing the statement

of agreed principles already worked out by the United States and the Soviet Union, and recommending that the new forum get on at once with the first business of this dangerous world—general and complete disarmament.

I ask Mr. Zorin whether his country cannot so conduct negotiations now that we and our respective allies may be able to turn to the rest of the members here, and to the hundreds of millions for whom they speak, and say: "We have not failed you."

Area of U.N. "Headquarters District and Immediate Vicinity" Enlarged

Press release 826 dated November 30

The Department of State and the Department of Justice on November 30 announced the enlargement, effective January 1, 1962, of the area in and near New York City to which aliens who are issued visas and admitted solely in transit to and from the United Nations headquarters district are limited. The term "headquarters district and its immediate vicinity" as used in section 11 and section 13(e) of the Agreement between the United States of America and the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,¹ which was approved by joint resolution of the Congress on August 4, 1947, will be redefined as "that area lying within a twenty-five mile radius of Columbus Circle, New York, New York."

The aliens affected by the redefinition are the comparatively few news media representatives and other invitees to the United Nations, most of whom would otherwise be ineligible for visas but who are admitted to the United States solely because of their responsibilities in connection with the United Nations and therefore are now restricted to the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity. The term "immediate vicinity of the United Nations headquarters district" has heretofore been defined as that area within Manhattan Island bounded on the north by East 97th St. and Transverse Road Number 4; on the west by Ninth Ave. (between 28th and 49th Sts.), Eighth Ave. (49th St. to Columbus Circle), and Central Park West (Columbus Circle to Transverse Road Number 4); on the south by 28th St. (from Ninth Ave. to First Ave.) and 26th St. (from First Ave. to East River Drive); and on the east by East River Drive.

¹ 61 Stat. 3416.

TREATY INFORMATION

Time Extended for Public Comment on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol

Department Announcement

Press release 824 dated November 29

The State Department refers to press release 679 of October 2, 1961, entitled "Invitation to Public to Submit Comments; Reconsideration of Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol"¹ and states that the date for the receipt of written comments regarding the reconsideration of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol has been extended from November 15, 1961, to December 1 and the date for the presentation of oral statements has been extended from December 4 to December 18. Presentation will be made beginning at 9:30 a.m. on December 18 in the main conference room (1309A), New State Building, 22d and C Streets, NW., Washington, D.C.

Persons and organizations desiring to be heard on December 18 should notify the Interagency Group on International Aviation, c/o Federal Aviation Agency, Washington 25, D.C., by December 1.

There has been established a public docket which will contain all pertinent comments received on the relationship of the United States to the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol thereto. This docket is available in the office of the General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency, Miss R. Chesley Prioleau, GC-2, Room C-226, 1711 New York Ave., Washington, D.C., telephone WOrth 7-3324.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 9, 1961.

Accession deposited: Nigeria, November 14, 1961.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of

stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 9, 1961.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 9, 1961.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and supplementary protocols no. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 20, 1961.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Acceptance deposited: Dominican Republic, October 31, 1961.

Notification of withdrawal: Indonesia, November 6, 1961. Effective November 6, 1961.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signatures: Greece, October 31, 1961; Nigeria, November 17, 1961.

Acceptances deposited: Ecuador, November 7, 1961; Nigeria, November 17, 1961.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, October 20, 1961.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, September 6, 1961.

Accessions deposited: Haiti, January 17, 1961; Iran, September 10, 1960.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Notification by United Kingdom of joint associate membership of: Sarawak and North Borneo, September 29, 1961.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 22, 1961.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 22, 1961.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1961, p. 692.

¹ Not in force.

Trade and Commerce

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹
Confirmation of signature deposited: Ghana, November 2, 1961.

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹

Signature: Sweden, November 1, 1961.

Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Sweden, November 1, 1961.

Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into force October 1, 1961.

Acceptance deposited: Norway, November 10, 1961.

United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Signature and acceptance: Ireland, October 3, 1961.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La Paz November 15, 1961. Entered into force November 15, 1961.

China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 21, 1961 (TIAS 4825). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei November 15, 1961. Entered into force November 15, 1961.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in El Salvador. Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador August 11, November 13 and 20, 1961. Entered into force November 13, 1961.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 26, 1961. Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta November 17, 1961. Entered into force November 17, 1961.

Pan American Union

Agreement concerning certain funds to be made available under the Alliance for Progress. Signed at Washington November 29, 1961. Entered into force November 29, 1961.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in the Republic of the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila October 11 and 31, 1961. Entered into force October 31, 1961.

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Khartoum November 14, 1961. Entered into force November 14, 1961.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 2, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4844 and 4868). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo November 11, 1961. Entered into force November 11, 1961.

Viet-Nam

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Saigon April 3, 1961. Entered into force November 30, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 10, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 27-December 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to November 27 are Nos. 786 of November 15; 798 of November 18; 802 of November 20; 804 and 805 of November 21; and 814 of November 22.

No.	Date	Subject
*816	11/27	Johnston designated AID mission director, Mexico (biographic details).
*817	11/27	U.S. participation in international conferences.
818	11/28	East German Communist intelligence official defects to West.
*819	11/28	Roberts appointed AID Director of Engineering (biographic details).
*820	11/28	Fowler sworn in as AID Deputy Regional Administrator for Far East (biographic details).
*821	11/28	Bowles: International Association of Machinists.
*822	11/28	Rusk: Academy of Political Science (excerpts).
823	11/29	AID industrial growth contract with Nigeria (rewrite).
824	11/29	Time extended for public comment on reconsideration of Warsaw convention and Hague protocol.
825	11/29	Assistance to Pan American Union projects (rewrite).
826	11/30	U.N. headquarters district area enlarged.
†827	11/30	Nunley: National Conference for International Economic and Social Development.
†828	12/1	Williams: "Africa's Challenge to American Enterprise."
829	11/30	Statement on Dominican Republic.
*830	12/1	Boerner designated Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
*831	12/1	Cultural exchange (Africa).
†832	12/1	Rusk: National Conference for International Economic and Social Development.
*833	12/2	Ball: interview on "Close Up."
*834	12/2	Rusk: interview on "College News Conference."
835	12/2	Missionaries released by Portugal.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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